Last week, I reviewed my imaginary cheapie NFBC hitting rosters, including the $14 offense, and the offense composed of hitters not even bought in auctions. Today, let’s now review the incredible $251 offense I built. This exercise was probably even harder, as it’s more difficult to differentiate between top three round values than it is to pick out the best of the worst. Let’s see how this roster ended up performing.
Yesterday, I reviewed my $9 NFBC pitching staff. Today, it’s time to review the pitching staff I constructed from only pitchers who failed to be rostered in NFBC auctions during the month of February.
Last week, I reviewed two fun exercises using the NFBC average auction values (AAV) from early March to build various imaginary offensive rosters, including a $14 squad composed solely of $1 players, and a team constructed from hitters that weren’t even rostered. Today, let’s flip to my various pitching staffs, beginning with the $9 group composed of all dollar guys.
Yesterday, I reviewed the thrilling $14 offense I built with all hitters that averaged just $1 in auction cost in NFBC leagues as of the beginning of March. Today, I review an even tougher challenge — an offense composed solely of hitters who weren’t purchased at all in the seven auctions that occurred in the month of Feb.
One of the more enjoyable exercises I performed before this season was building a $14 NFBC offense, using the contests’ average auction values. The idea was to choose from the 59 hitters that averaged $1 in cost and put together an entire legal offense, filling each required slot. Let’s see how this squad performed, with final FanGraphs calculated auction values included.
Yesterday, I reviewed the eight hitters on my 2021 potential HR/FB rate surger list. Today, let’s once again rely on my xHR/FB rate equation to review my preseason potential HR/FB rate decliners list.
Today, I continue reviewing my 2021 preseason predictions by moving onto my list of potential HR/FB rate surgers. I used my xHR/FB rate to identify and discuss a handful of names that posted actual HR/FB rates well below what my equation calculated as a deserved mark. Since 2020 was a short season, there were a lot more significant gaps between xHR/FB rate and actual HR/FB rate, so there should have been less reliance on both marks given that we had smaller sample sizes to work with.
Yesterday, I reviewed my pre-season post comparing my xHR/FB rate to actual HR/FB rate from 2020, revealing which players sustained those 2020 HR/FB rate gains. Today, let’s now flip to the other side — those players in which xHR/FB rate validated a 2020 HR/FB rate decline. Did their 2020 marks represent a new, lower level of sustained production or did it turn out to be a short season fluke? Let’s find out.
Confused by the title? For most of the rest of this year, I’m going to review all my preseason, and some in-season, posts where I made predictions or used one of my xMetrics to make statements. I think accountability is extremely important in this industry, as our reputation should hinge upon the quality, and accuracy, of the advice we give. Today, I’m reviewing a post that pitted my xHR/FB rate against actual HR/FB rate. These were the guys who enjoyed HR/FB rate spikes in 2020 that my equation validated, or confirmed was real or mostly real. Let’s find out if these hitters held onto their 2020 HR/FB rate gains in 2021.
For the first time this year, I added an all-star break hitter poll to pair with my pitcher poll. The hitter poll pitted the 10 greatest xwOBA overperformers against the 10 most significant underperformers. I asked you which group would post a higher second half wOBA and which range each group’s wOBA would fall into.
