On Finishing a Disappointing 2nd in AL Tout Wars

In 2013, I won the inaugural year of the Tout Wars Mixed Draft league. I was rewarded with a promotion to one of the three live auction leagues and was ecstatic to have been slotted into the storied American League only version, made famous by the fantastic book Fantasyland. Unfortunately, year one in AL Tout Wars went terribly, as I finished 10th. As further punishment, my team garnered fewer than 60 fantasy points, which resulted in me beginning the 2015 season with a reduced FAAB.

As a result, I vowed to make a strategic change at the auction this time around by trying my best to ignore empty-OBP guys, unless they came at a gargantuan discount. Since OBP is a category and a player’s contribution is already baked into my dollar value, it’s impossible to ignore the category. But if given the choice of two similarly valued players (which I would never be given since this is an auction), I decided it was worth pursuing the one with the better counting stats and worse OBP. The Joe Mauer/John Jaso/Ryan Hanigan types were hopefully not going to find their way onto my team.

The strategy worked on the offensive side, as I accumulated the second most hitting points. And oh yeah, I won the OBP category again, of course. But my counting stats were actually good for a change. And despite spending just $57 on pitching (just 21.9% of our budget), I managed to finish in the middle of the pack in terms of total pitching points.

But, I finished second. And I’m disappointed.

Let’s begin by providing you with a refresher course on my auctioned team and perhaps you might also be interested in my original comments from after the auction:

C – Russell Martin, $19
C – Alex Avila, 8
1B – Prince Fielder, 28
3B – Jose Iglesias, 1
CI – Ike Davis, 5
2B – Devon Travis, 1
SS – Hanley Ramirez, 28
MI – Josh Rutledge, 5
OF – Jose Bautista, 37
OF – Mookie Betts, 24
OF – Desmond Jennings, 16
OF – Steven Souza, 16
Util – Steve Pearce, 13
SW – David DeJesus, 1
P – R.A. Dickey, 10
P – Scott Kazmir, 9
P – Wade Miley, 7
P – CC Sabathia, 5
P – Nate Karns, 1
P – Adam Warren, 1
P – Koji Uehara, 15
P – Sean Doolittle, 8
P – Kevin Jepsen, 1
B – Brandon Guyer
B – Logan Forsythe
B – A.J. Griffin
B – Colby Lewis

Though I feared I would have to scramble for a middle infielder to open the year when Rutledge lost the Angels’ starting second baseman competition, Nick Franklin’s injury in Tampa Bay allowed Forsythe to earn regular at-bats, en route to a breakout year. With a projected strong offense, hot starts from Travis, Hanley and even DeJesus (who I tried to trade hard, but nobody bit), along with expected play from the rest of the guys, I was leading every single hitting category early in the season for a while. I was feeling real good, especially because I figured to get back Doolittle to give me a second closer some time in May.

For the majority of the first half of the season, my team sat in first place thanks to a fantastic offense and a good enough pitching staff. Kazmir was proving that last year’s poor second half was just that and not a sign of things to come. Karns was making good on his sleeper status, as was Warren. Even with poor starts from Dickey, Miley and Sabathia, my pitching wasn’t terrible.

But then the wheels fell off. The injuries started to mount and seemingly every week another one of my hitters fell victim to something or other that required a DL stint. I won’t rehash them of course, nor do I want to make any excuses. But in a mono-league in which the free agent pool is slim to say the least, injuries could be devastating. So naturally, my lead in the offensive categories began to slip, and they continued their free fall. I was never able to recover.

I used the free agent pool very minimally. It’s not that I wasn’t aggressive in the FAAB bidding, but there was rarely a player available that I felt would make a significant impact and therefore warranted a hefty bid. That’s not to say there weren’t players who turned out to be pretty valuable, I just didn’t didn’t expect them to be and wasn’t aggressive bidding on them. I almost always got who I wanted, mostly players to be used as relatively short-term injury replacements. Ketel Marte was a nice pickup, helping when Travis dealt with shoulder issues during most of the second half. Tyler Collins performed respectably and was in my lineup for most of his MLB at-bats this year.

That’s it though, no other hitter that I did not draft collected more than 100 at-bats on my team…except Troy Tulowitzki. Since I didn’t spend a whole lot of FAAB heading into the trade deadline, I ranked fourth in total dollars at the time and knew I was going to get one of Carlos Gomez, Johnny Cueto, Cole Hamels or Tulo. I was shocked to get Tulo, but aside from his 24 runs scored, he was nothing special. And of course, his last game in my lineup came on Sept 12th thanks to an I-shouldn’t-be-surprised injury. I didn’t intend to hoard FAAB to get a top trade deadline guy coming over, it just happened that way. I didn’t benefit as much as I had hoped.

On the pitching side of the ledger, I got solid work out of Erasmo Ramirez from the free agent pool and was helped by a nice run by Mike Fiers upon his trade to the Astros. The only other pitcher to provide me with meaningful innings from free agency was Martin Perez and his results weren’t any good.

I made one trade, swapping Kazmir for Cody Allen. At the time, Kazmir’s ERA sat in the low 2.00s and his SIERA was significantly higher. I knew the clock would strike midnight at any time and another closer had the potential of gaining me a bunch of saves points. I was right about Kazmir, as he provided my trade partner with a 5.60 ERA, 1.59 WHIP and just one win over 10 starts, while Allen saved 12 games. But it just was too little, too late.

It’s pretty amazing to me that with relatively little outside help, I essentially rode my auctioned team all year long and still managed to finish in second, many injuries after. I was really confident in my team heading into May and with several breakouts and solid play from my healthy veterans, I was dreaming of a win come October. Sadly, Chris Liss’ team enjoyed a roaring second half and his preemptive pickup of Carlos Correa was simply too much to overcome.





Mike Podhorzer is the 2015 Fantasy Sports Writers Association Baseball Writer of the Year. He produces player projections using his own forecasting system and is the author of the eBook Projecting X 2.0: How to Forecast Baseball Player Performance, which teaches you how to project players yourself. His projections helped him win the inaugural 2013 Tout Wars mixed draft league. Follow Mike on Twitter @MikePodhorzer and contact him via email.

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Jonathan Sher
8 years ago

Mike, could you please post a link to the tout wars A.L. site? Seeing the full context of decisions is a lot more illuminating.

I’m curious, for example, who picked up Lance McCullers in May and for how much. He might have gone a long way improving your pitching results. I employ a similar approach to yours in that I spend relatively little on pitching, $51 to be precise this year, though I had the advantage of being in a keepers league, so I had a $3 Sonny Grey (picked him up when he was still in the minors), a $10 Carlos Carrasco (picked up before his breakout last year) and Carlos Rodon on a reserve list since just before he was drafted in 2014.

Even with those keepers, when you spend sub-$60 on pitching, your staff tends to be shallow, and mine was, so when McCullers was promoted, I spent just over half my FAAB budget on him — I was convinced by scouting reports and minor league numbers that he would put up strong numbers — and I’m in a strikeout league.

I’d love to get some stiffer competition of the sort Tout leagues offer. Love the guys in my league but not everyone is as obsessed and you and me.

In any case, congrats on 2nd even if it stings for now. That’s two strong finished in three years against strong competition.

Jonathan Sher
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

Thanks for the link — It looks like I can access most things, including winning bids for free agents, though I’m not sure yet if I can see losing bids.

I moves so hard on McCullers because my league is even deeper than yours, with 17-man reserves, 40-man rosters and 12 A.L. owners, so the leftover talent is thin enough to see through. The risk of missing a potential impact player is greater than the risk of over-bidding because the opportunity costs are minimal. That is even more true when said player is available relatively early-on in the season.

As for expectations, I know his Steamer projections were well north of a 4.00 ERA, so I understand your caution, but in my league, with 480 players on rosters, one needs to gamble more on upside, and in McCullers case, both his stats, and given the limited sample size, more importantly, the scouting narrative pointed to a real chance at a breakout. Among others, FG’s Chris Mitchell had a nice piece, with an assist from Kiley: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/astros-throw-lance-mccullers-into-the-fire/

Taking a cursory look at winning free agent bids, I note the following:

(1) Four owner were left with an unspent balance in the double digits; three left between $5 and $9 on the table.

(2) Big sums of money were spent at the MLB deadline when players have just 8 weeks to contribute. $74 on Carlos Gomez. $45 on Ben Revere. $31 on Parra, $30 on Cole Hammels. $25 on Fiers. Fairly big sums on players with high risk too. Steve Moyer spent $104 on Aug. 3 from a $121 budget. It’s bad timing to find value and production because most owners have left vast sums unspent and then seek to compete for players at a time when many are growing increasingly desperate because the time left to make up ground is fast disappearing.

My league has rather simplistic FAAB rules, which while I don’t like, make it easier to plan spending. We have five monthly auctions. The first provides five months of value, the second four months, and so on. That’s 15 months of value in total, and since the first auction offers 5 months of value, a smart owners targets spending one-third of his FAAB, less astute owners target one-fifth, so there is a market inefficiency that one can use to one’s advantage.

Jonathan Sher
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

Looking at the FAAB numbers in your league, they support the notion that teams generally wait too late in the season to spend, than spend at the precise moment their is a feeding frenzy:

(1) While only 35% of the games are left in the MLB schedule after Aug 3, your league collectively spent 44% of its FAAB dollars on or after that date, a total of $497 our of $1,124 spent. Using the approach I suggest above, the rational amount to spend — if all available talent was spread out equally — would be 13%

(2) On Aug. 3 alone, your league spent $322 or 29% of dollars spent.

I realize, of course, that talent is not spread out equally, that the trade deadline brings with it inter-league trades and a greater concentration of incoming talent. But unless that incoming talent is between four and five times as much as the sum of all talent spread out across the total season, owners are under-bidding earlier in the season and over-bidding come August.

Jonathan Sher
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

Looking over the talent that went for cheap well before August: Carlos Correa(1) Shawn Tolleson (1) Mark Canha (7) McCullers (9), Chris Young (1), Chris Colobello (9), Danny Valencia (1) Luis Severino (1), Carson Smith (0) Ryan Raburn (1) Jackie Bardley jr. (10) Eddie Rosario (1), Cody Anderson (2) , Keola Kela (6), and Jarrod Dyson (7). Collectively, they cost $55. That doesn’t include bigger ticket signings like Trumbo and Lindor.

I don’t think people were consciously hoarding for the trade deadline; but I do think the numbers are strong evidence that owners may have under-estimated the value of earlier-season pick-ups and that resulted in having a ton of money to spend at the trade deadline.

The one owner who most bucked that trend was the owner who won the league, with Chris Liss picking up Canha, Tolleson, Correa, McCullers and Chris Young, creating a massive amount of surplus value for just $17 of his FAAB.

Jonathan Sher
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

You have gotten exactly to the point I hoped you would get to. It is an issue of timing but not one of strictly luck. If you wait to bid on proven players, in a deep league, they are so scarce, you end up paying through the nose and often at a time late in the season when it’s too late to make up deficiencies and when you are competing with other owners who find themselves with desperate needs and a lot of spending money.

The deeper the league, the more critical it becomes to acquire players before their value becomes obvious to everyone. And that involves skill — you need to be able not only to evaluate talent but the need of each MLB team.

Let’s look at the example you mentioned, Shawn Tolleson. Here’s what I knew before opening day:

(1) Neftali Feliz was awful in 2014, with a SIERA of 4.40, and FIP of 4.60 and an xFIP of 4.90, a k-rate that had dropped below 6/nine innings a K/bb rate of less than 2 and a FB velocity of about 3 mph less than its peak. He missed most of 2013 to injury, he was nearly as bad in 2012 and he was only marginally better in 2011. He was breathing off the fumes of a great debut in 2009 and a solid year in 2010.

(2) The manager who had believed in Feliz and who was loyal to a fault was gone with a new guy in Jeff Bannister who had no such loyalties.

(3) Tolleson had performed well as set-up man and was really the only guy in the pen viewed by the Rangers as having a credible arm, a good and healthy track record and some veteran experience.

While it is true that the closer position the past year or two in the AL has been one of general unrest, with a fair amount of turnover, it was clear that Feliz was perhaps the closest to being pushed off the plank and be replaced. So, with all due respect, it wasn’t luck that drew Liss to him — it was prudence and foresight.

For a similar reason, in our deeper auction, I bid on and obtained Keona Kela, not in the reserve auction but for my starting roster. At $1 he produced a lot of surplus value as a setup man, and while he didn’t get the nod to close, his potential to do so proved pivotal when I packaged him and another player for Chris Davis in early-June.

Certainly, luck plays a role in all aspects of fantasy baseball. You lucked into Logan Forsythe this year (because your preferred reserve choice was taken); I lucked into Stephen Vogt this year under similar circumstances.

But it would be a mistake to dismiss Liss’s pick as a product of pure luck or the broader market inefficiency. It’s why a credible reliever behind a fragile closer goes for $1 in April (Tolleson) while a reliever coming off two surgerieswgo gets his turn on the merry-go-round in Detroit goes for $25 Aug. 3 (Alex Wilson)

Here’s another example: Carlos Correa. Not only was he universally regarded as a top 10 prospect, he got off to a blazing start in AA, starting Astros SS Jed Lowrie tears the ligaments in his thumb in late-April and Houston got off to such a great start it became reasonable to expect the organization might be more aggressive with Correa than orginally thought — the Astros had the best record in the A.L. on May 14 when Liss picked him up for $1 — he debuted 24 days later.

Jonathan Sher
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

Unless I am reading the bids incorrectly (and perhaps I am) it appears you bid $8 on McAllister, a second owner bid $4, while Liss won him with $9, so it wasn’t a case of overlooking his potential value, it was a case of under-bidding.

One question of clarification; now that I see t he actual bids I see some differences between the amounts of the bids and the amounts posted separately on the winning bids page. Correa, for example, is listed at $34 for the former and $1 for the latter. Explanation?

McNulty
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

Is it a Vickrey system?

Adrock
8 years ago
Reply to  Mike Podhorzer

I have to echo Jonathan’s analysis. Underbidding early in the year is a major inefficiency across deep-league pools.

This was a tremendous year for elite talent switching leagues, but the value provided by Cueto, Tulowitzki, Gomez, etc. pales in comparison to the less-heralded names above earlier in the year.

Now, it does require a willingness to miss frequently (as not all of your potential sleepers will pay off), but active roster management and speculative ML pickups of elite (or merely very good) talent that’s likely to have an opportunity to play is an essential approach in deep leagues with skilled co-owners.