Two-Strike Counts and Weak Contact

In an MLB.com article from earlier this month, Adam Berry investigates the secrets of the Rays’ pitching staff. First, read the article because it contains so many great pieces of information. I wish MLB.com did more pieces like this one.

And the guts of the article comes down to this quote:

The Rays don’t employ a one-size-fits-all philosophy, Snyder said, besides imploring pitchers to throw strikes and get to a two-strike count as quickly as possible. Beyond that, their approach is player-centered: They recognize what each pitcher does best, which they can typically tell by identifying what each does most consistently, and revolve everything around that.

Two-strike counts are important? In previous work, I’ve noticed pitchers who are behind in the count generate weaker contact along with those who have a diversified pitch mix. It’s time to dive into the effects of two strikes counts and determine if they can help pitchers limit hard contact.

I should have noticed and looked into the effects years ago since it was staring me in the face at Baseball-Reference. Here are the league-wide ISO values for hitters at various counts.

Once hitters are facing two strikes, their power disappears as they defend the plate and try to just make contact.

I should just start diving into the numbers on how the theory is supported, but that’s not the case. All the pitchers who lead the two-strike rankings are high strikeout pitchers. (e.g. Jacob deGrom and Max Scherzer).

The strikeout rate advantage overwhelms any weakly hit effects. Basically, strikeout pitchers generate weaker contact because they can get to two strikes.

This advantage can be seen in the inputs to SIERA.

Strikeouts are good…even better than FIP suggests. High strikeout pitchers generate weaker contact, which means they allow fewer hits (AKA have lower BABIPs) and have lower homerun rates. The same can be said of relievers, as they enter the game for a short period of time and pitch with more intensity.

I proceeded to spend a few hours dividing up the data to find any significant results including removing the strikeout. It was P-hacking at its finest but to no avail. There isn’t an obvious measurable stat adjustment to getting to two strikes prevents that isn’t already being measured.

That doesn’t mean there isn’t something to squeeze out, but for me, I’m going to continue using the Ahead/Behind ratio for two reasons. First, I was able to measure how much pitchers who are ahead limit hard contact.

Second, the Ahead/Behind ratio doesn’t correlate as much to strikeouts as the 2-strike%.

Correlation: r-squared
Ahead/behind to 2-strike%: .39
Ahead/behind to K%: .19
2-strike% to K%: .43

The batted ball effects of the Ahead/behind ratio are easier to isolate since it has a smaller influence on strikeouts.

The more I dive in, the coaching genius of “get to two strikes as quickly as possible” becomes apparent. Going back to the league-wide results with two strikes, any pitcher pitching staff allowing those numbers, no matter the reason (i.e. strikeouts or weakly hit balls), will thrive. With a two-strike goal, it’s the pitcher’s job to find a way to get to two strikes. Once at two strikes, the results will follow.

Maybe someone can massage the two-strike data to unearth a groundbreaking discovery. I’m likely not that person. While being ahead in the count matters, too many factors are in play with two strikes to make it a better predictor of weak contact as the Ahead/Behind ratio.