Archive for Slider

Using my Pitch Leaderboard, I identified every “new” pitch* thrown during MLB’s glorious first weekend. Then, using my Pitch Comps tool, which uses pitch specs (like velocity, spin rate, movement, and release points) to compare pitches to one another, I wanted to see if I could make any quantifiable declarations about the quality of these pitches in small samples. I can’t write about everyone, so I’ll select the most interesting ones (in my humble opinion).

(*Including existing pitches from rookies for whom we now finally have MLB statcast data as well as existing pitches thrown by players who missed all of 2021 due to injury. It will be interesting to see if the latter group looks measurably different post-injury than they did pre-injury.)

At the end of the season, I’ll revisit to find out these comps were actually indicative (i.e., “predictive,” in a sense) of quality, but it’s also strongly possible the comps will change as samples grow. This is very experimental, but it’s something I’ve wanted to try in the past but hadn’t found the motivation to do.

Why pitch comps? I know I am prone to bias watching a handful of pitches from a pitcher. I can’t scout because I can deceive myself into just about any conclusion (and I think the same can be said for most of us, whether we like it or not).

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Trevor Bauer, the National Fantasy Baseball Championship’s No.-9 starting pitcher and No.-31 player overall, has pitched to the tune of a 4.12 ERA this year. All things considered (“things” being, primarily, the juiced ball), Bauer hasn’t been awful. But after compiling a pristine 2.21 ERA in last year’s breakout with equally pristine ERA estimators to boot (3.14 xFIP, 3.21 SIERA), this year’s peripherals (4.35 xFIP, 4.21 SIERA) are far less inspiring, even when adjusted for context.

The easiest way to write off Bauer’s 2018 season as an aberration is, well, to look at everything else he has ever done. He sports a career 3.97 ERA, with just one season (2018) with an ERA under 4.00. The blind squirrel who took an approach as simplistic as this in 2019 would have invariably found a nut.

Such an approach, however, would grossly undersell Bauer’s gains in 2018, which were quite legitimate. Using the most basic of peripherals, Bauer’s swinging strike rate (SwStr%) took the best 3rd-biggest step forward in nominal terms, behind only Patrick Corbin (and his slider) and Gerrit Cole (and his fastball).

Yet 2018 gains do not necessarily beget sustained excellence. Bauer’s narrative is a fairly complex one, so let’s give it proper attention.

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Fantasy owners have been chasing, to no avail, Chris Archer’s 2015 season, during which he recorded a 29% strikeout rate with a 3.23 ERA. After finishing just outside the top-50 overall by National Fantasy Baseball Championship (NFBC) average draft position (ADP), Archer averaged the No. 50 pick from 2016 through 2018. Unfortunately, the outcomes annually and in aggregate have been awful…

… even though his peripherals before and after 2015 have been nearly identical. That’s the persistent problem with Archer: he has given us perpetual reason to chase results he may never again achieve.

I’m here to argue Archer’s woes started not in 2016, when his ERA ballooned to 4.02, but in 2015 — yes, his career year. That’s because he stopped throwing his sinker in 2015, opting instead to rely on a pitifully bad four-seam fastball as his primary offering. His 2015 success can be attributed primarily to his slider, which he began to feature much more prominently, but the remaining success was thanks to good luck.

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For a pitcher who has been ignored by the vast majority of fantasy owners this season, we’ve given Felix Pena quite a bit of attention here at RotoGraphs. Back in July, both Jeff Zimmerman and Paul Sporer noted Pena’s somewhat limited sleeper appeal. More recently, Jeff pointed out Pena’s declining fastball velocity and strikeout rate in his analysis of most-dropped players.
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Some good pitchers, despite being good pitchers, throw bad pitches. And there are bad pitchers, too, who throw good pitches. Both are true, and one could make an argument a Venn Diagram of the two groups may overlap significantly, and that overlapping area is the group of pitchers toeing the line between breaking out and being unusable for fantasy purposes.

It stands to reason, then, that good and bad pitchers could benefit from easing off or completely abandoning their bad pitches. It’s one thing to evaluate a pitch based on its underlying metrics — its swinging strike rate (SwStr%), its ground ball rate (GB%), its velocity, and so on. It’s another thing to evaluate the pitch objectively by looking at its weighted on-base average (wOBA) allowed, which, I hope, in an adequately large sample, can indicate a pitch’s quality regardless of its peripherals. In theory, the larger the sample size, the greater the probability a pitch’s outcomes will converge with its inputs, such that the caveat “regardless of its peripherals” doesn’t actually mean anything. Given enough pitches thrown, the aforementioned underlying metrics will adequately inform the wOBA allowed.

Using PITCHf/x data from the last two years, I looked for (1) good pitchers who throws pitches that allow (2a) extremely bad wOBAs with (2b) unusually low BABIPs. Incurring high wOBAs on low BABIPs is less than ideal; if BABIP is subject to high variance and generally converges on the league average, then a bad pitch being “lucky” by BABIP suggests things will only get worse.

This post was going to be about several pitchers, each with their own problematic pitches, but I became too passionate about this single case. This is about Dylan Bundy, his abhorrently bad four-seamer, his fantastic slider, and how much his pitch selection is suffocating his potential. Ultimately, it’s about adding by subtracting.

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Every time an analyst uses the caveat “small sample size, but,” an angel gets its wings. And then that angel takes flight and also analyzes a small sample size.

I preach patience when it comes to the first few weeks of a Major League Baseball season, and I try to practice it, too, regarding both early-season breakouts and duds. Aside from transactions related to the disabled list, I have yet to drop any player I drafted who wasn’t legitimately dead weight (like my decaying shares of Melky Cabrera and John Lackey) or, in ottoneu, a roster burden, such as a hapless $7 share of a helpless Alex Cobb.

That said, I can’t simply wait until mid-May or whatever to make meaningful analyses of players. But I also can’t make knee-jerk reactions about 30 innings or 90 plate appearances. I try to reconcile this cognitive dissonance by engaging in what I called last year Small Sample Normalization Services (SSNS). The intent: first, to attempt to find similarly long and (un)productive streaks in a player’s past; second, to evaluate how similar or comparable those streaks actually are; and, last, to slap an appropriate level of excitement or panic to the performance in question. If we can’t say with absolute certainty that we’re watching a player do something sustainable, then maybe it helps to know if he had done something similar in the past. If not, what befell him afterward? And if so, how should we move forward with him?

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Normally I don’t write about bad players. It’s more of a truism than anything: writers like to analyze the breakout or peak-performance potential of top prospects or, alternatively, red flags associated with the game’s premier talents. Rarely do we write about objectively bad players.

Through 120 Major League innings (and change), Robert Stephenson has been an objectively bad starting pitcher, having compiled a 5.10 ERA, an anemic 1.63 strikeout-to-walk ratio (K/BB), and 0.1 WAR. A former 1st-round pick and a consensus top-100 prospect for four consecutive years, Stephenson quickly fell from grace after a catastrophic small-sample debut in 2016. Entering his age-25 season, though, he still has plenty of time to turn things around.

That’s the beauty of baseball: an objectively bad player can become an objectively good one, sometimes overnight. 2017 was a banner year for post-hype prospects, all of whom seemed, at one point or another, destined for eternal mediocrity and former-prospect bustitude. I think Stephenson can become an objectively good pitcher, but it’ll take work.

Here’s a top-10 list, presented ordinally and without the statistic by which I’ve ordered it, of pitchers who accomplished something in 2017, from a list of hundreds of other data points:

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For all intents and purposes, Kevin Gausman had a bad season. Like, catastrophically bad, such that has ERA was 10th-worst among qualified starters. That he was allowed to see enough innings to become a qualified starter should be construed as nothing short of a blessing for him.

On paper, sure. This narrative works on the surface, at the macro level. But Gausman had himself a season of two incredibly different halves. An aside: if you don’t pay attention to FanGraphs’ community research, you should. User jkved10 wrote a post about Gausman on July 24 — about the time I reluctantly convinced myself to roster him in my primary home league — in which jkved10 noticed a sudden change in Gausman’s release point. Kudos to the author for doing all the heavy lifting for me. Click through to familiarize yourself with the events that unfolded and the ensuing analysis, or dig around Brooks Baseball for yourself.

The results weren’t immediately promising at the time of his/her writing: a 4.94 ERA across six starts. Everything else under the hood, however, had changed: 12.2 strikeouts and only 2.6 walks per nine innings (K/9, BB/9), good for a 3.19 xFIP. Sure, everything else stunk; he was still allowing home runs and hits on balls in play at astronomical rates. But the peripherals very dramatically improved, having essentially doubled his K’s and halving his walks in that span.

Such success continued. In his 19 starts from June 21 onward, Gausman struck out 10 hitters-per-nine and recorded a 3.39 ERA despite a still-inflated rate of home runs to fly balls (HR/FB). A tale of two halves, indeed: prior to June 21, his 6.60 ERA was almost exactly doubly large. He was a second-half ace, and this was more than just regression to the mean — his success correlated, if not directly resulted from, his adjustment.

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If you’re a nostalgic fantasy baseballer, you’ll remember that Patrick Corbin generated 3.5 wins above replacement (WAR) in his first full season of baseball before suffering the dreaded curse of Tommy John. (If you’re even more nostalgic, or more likely an Angels fan, you’ll remember he was traded alongside Tyler Skaggs for Dan Haren.) Corbin returned to baseball in 2015, and he shoved, seemingly indicating he suffered no ill effects of his surgery.

Yet 2016 was an unmitigated disaster, culminating in a midseason move to the bullpen and a full-season 5.15 ERA. A low strand rate (LOB%) is the blame — virtually no one suffers a 64.8% strand rate for a full season without some bad luck — but poor control and a home run problem complicated things. It appears to me Corbin ran afoul in two distinct ways in 2016.

It also appears to me he may have recalibrated himself. In his last three starts, he has struck out 23 and walked only four across 19.1 innings, good for a 1.86 ERA / 2.53 xFIP / 2.59 FIP.

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Rubby de la Rosa twirled a gem Monday night.* It was a night of several unlucky fantasy pitching performances: Corey Kluber, Chris Sale, Matt Harvey and John Lackey together struck out 34 batters and allowed only three runs in a combined 32 innings pitched, and the Twitterverse made sure everyone knew.

Yet there was de la Rosa, plugging away against the Marlins (and against Dan Haren, who admirably tossed eight innings of two-run ball in defense), needing only 94 pitches to get through a full nine innings of play. Rubby, too, settled for a no-decision, his due to a poorly timed two-run homer allowed to J.T. Realmuto in the 7th inning.

I was reluctant to invest in Rubby at first, remembering his wholly disappointing 2014 season. (In his defense, he was never really a touted, let alone highly touted, prospect, even within the Dodgers and Red Sox systems, so the term “disappointment” is used loosely here.) However, I have bought several shares of Rubby in the past couple of weeks due in large part to a smattering of injuries but also a series of respectable performances by de la Rosa.

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