Mistakes Were Made by Brad Johnson November 16, 2017 Everybody makes a bad trade every now and then. I made dozens of trades during the 2017 season – most of which were very favorable to me. But two trades and one non-swap came back to haunt me when the season concluded. Let’s explore. Acquired Bradley Zimmer for Eugenio Suarez, Jesus Sanchez, and Carter Kieboom This trade was made in a 20 team dynasty league with weekly lineups and 5×5 roto scoring (OBP). We keep 28 players and roster 45 overall. There are no other costs or limits associated with keepers. I executed this deal on August 1. At the time of the swap, my team was just 10 steals back from gaining nine points in the stolen base category. Those nine points were the difference between eighth and third place. I determined that converting a zero steal roster spot into a five-category asset would give me the best chance of earning those points without forfeiting others. Since I stood to earn $300 in real money, I was willing to overpay in future value. Prior to the trade, Zimmer hit .282/.345/.464 with eight home runs and 14 steals. Once in our lineup, he hit .159/.239/.220. Although he did swipe five bags, he didn’t reach base often enough to help our cause. To make matters worse, Suarez batted .268/.387/.465 while tallying eight homers, 30 runs, 28 RBI, and a steal. Luckily, I was able to grind out a third place finish without the stolen bases. However, had I simply not made this trade, I would have had a much larger margin for error in the final week of the season. And I’d still have Sanchez and Kieboom. Even if I prefer Zimmer to Suarez going forward (I do), I could probably now acquire him for Suarez alone. The lesson is simple. Even as I negotiated for Zimmer, I stressed to his owner that he was selling high. Double-barreled regression usually bites hot-hitting rookies after a month or two. Scouting reports catch up, and exploits are discovered. There’s always a chance the player continues to mash (see Cody Bellinger), and that’s what I had hoped would happen. At least I’m left holding a talented 25-year-old in a keep forever league. Did Not Acquire Tommy Pham for Ben Zobrist or Kendrys Morales This non-move occurred in the same dynasty league. It was a disastrous failure to convert a fading veteran into a burgeoning stud. Pham’s owner originally came to me asking for Zobrist or Morales plus a small piece. He later (briefly) dropped the demand for a throw-in. This all occurred in early June. I know exactly why I passed on the deal. Pham was playing well, but he had done this in previous seasons. Prior to 2017, he’s always turned pumpkin after a hot streak. Moreover, the Cardinals have roughly 35 MLB-quality outfielders. In St. Louis, even a modest slump can get a talented player sent to Triple-A. I was certain Pham would find his way back to the bench or part time duty. Since our dynasty league uses weekly rosters, good part time players don’t have much value. By not making the swap, I missed out on a .310/.413/.529 batting line from Pham along with 18 home runs and 20 stolen bases. Those numbers would have made the Zimmer deal completely unnecessary. I still would have finished third place, but it would have been a comfortable ending to the season with a 10 to 15 point pad. Worse, Pham is now a vastly superior trade asset to Zobrist and Morales. At the end of the day, I’d still make the same decision nine times out of 10. The exception is a scenario in which I’m both swimming in second base (or first base) depth and short on outfielders. This strikes me as an example of good process, bad result. As an added aside, if you own Pham in a similar dynasty format, I strongly recommend selling high. His playing time is still endangered by an overly deep roster. However, at least a few owners in your league are probably willing to completely overlook that risk when setting a valuation. Traded Madison Bumgarner ($49) for Felipe Rivero ($8) This was a rare management mistake. In early-August, I had a seemingly insurmountable lead in my home league, a huge surplus of innings, and a rotation chock full of cheap, valuable keepers like Jimmy Nelson, Alex Wood, James Paxton, Zack Godley, and Brad Peacock. I also had Chris Archer and Jon Lester. I had no reason to believe I wouldn’t win with ease. Since my only vulnerable-looking category was saves and I had too many innings, I swapped MadBum for a keeper. Of course, most of those pitchers cratered and/or landed on the disabled list. At the end of the season, I finished in second place by 2.5 points. Four wins would have secured an additional 1.5 points. Five wins would have bought me a tie for first place. Seven or eight victories would have spiked my total by four or five points. In strikeouts, I missed a two point swing by just nine punchouts – and that’s where I really missed Bumgarner. With the Giants ace, I could have managed my waiver wire stream with just a little more focus – easily picking up those extra strikeouts and possibly the wins. I also would have been freed to chase some home runs where I finished just three short of another point. I would have needed to scrounge some late season saves to replace Rivero, but they were available. The difference between finishing first and second was about $150. The lesson here – never trust your pitching depth.