Kicking Rocks: Buying Low on Adam Dunn

The first half of the 2011 season saw two of the game’s better power hitters fall into a veritable abyss when it came to production.  Both players were joining new teams, both signed big contracts, and both were drafted with home run expectations that were sky high.  But both Dan Uggla and Adam Dunn struggled mightily to begin the year, and while those that drafted them were becoming more and more frustrated by the day, other GMs were sitting back and licking their chops, waiting for the moment of a huge buy-low opportunity.  Those that tried it with Uggla just finished reaping the benefits of a 33 game hit streak and a .361-12-28 second half run.  Those of us who chose Dunn?  Well….not so much.

It seemed like a no-brainer — buying Dunn for sixty to seventy cents on the dollar back in early June.  He hadn’t hit fewer than 38 HR in each of his previous seven seasons, he picked up his batting average into the .260’s the past two years, he started showing some signs of life in May, and his owners remained unbelievably frustrated.  The Dunn owner in my league had just lost Buster Posey, so I thought I was being smooth by swooping in with an offer of Michael Morse, Alexi Ogando and Jonathan Lucroy in exchange for Dunn and Shaun Marcum.  No way were my three guys ever going to keep up their levels of production all year and I was getting back a rock solid starter and an expected 30 bombs.

::cue the Let’s Make a Deal “Zonk” music::

What a disaster and a completely wrong read on Dunn on my part.  Morse has had a fantastic season, Lucroy has been one of the better and more consistent backstops, and while Ogando hit a few bumps in the road in June, he chose to thrive rather than whither in the Texas summer heat come July.  I got a banged-up, struggling Marcum and 287 pounds of dead weight on my bench.  Of course, not before I left him in my lineup to siphon batting average points from my team for far longer than I should have allowed.

So where were the indicators?  What did I miss?  Was it the fact that his walk rate dropped and strikeout rate soared in 2010?  Couldn’t that have just been chalked up to an overzealous slugger trying to do too much in a contract year?  His total output in HR and RBI were right on par, as was his .276 ISO.  His wOBA (.379) took a little dip, but certainly not enough to put up any red flags and he had a 3.5 WAR, the highest it had been since 2004.  A lot of head-scratching going on.

I suppose I underestimated the two most obvious changes — the switch to the American League and the move to full-time DH.  I figured there to be an adjustment period for Dunn in the early goings of the season, but I also thought the benefits of hitting at U.S. Cellular would help counter that.  When he started off so poorly, I assumed he would make the necessary adjustments and after a slow start, would take off.  But I guess I should have heeded the words of almost every slugger headed towards full-time DH dutywho discussed the difficulties of staying mentally sharp when not playing the field.  It seems that Dunn had those very same difficulties and just couldn’t work himself out of them.  It got so bad, that he even started talking retirement.

I’ll just have to chalk it up to the ol’ “win some, lose some” this year and hope for greener pastures in future seasons in this league.  I made the necessary adjustments to my roster to keep my team competitive and am still vying for a top 3 spot.  However, I’ll consider this the lesson learned on Dunn and never trust him again.  Of course, that tune might change after watching him hit 40 dingers for some other team next year.