Do Number One Prospects Succeed Immediately?
Jurickson Profar has a strong chance at being the consensus best prospect in baseball entering the season. Both MLB.com and ESPN’s Keith Law agree, ranking him in the top slot. And while Baseball America hasn’t divulged their list yet, Profar graces the cover of this year’s Prospect Handbook. For FG+ this season, which you should buy if you haven’t already, I did an article looking at whether it’s worth it to draft prospects in a re-draft league. Since I found playing time to be a major factor in whether a prospect can be successful during their rookie year, I did not look at whether the elite prospects were more likely to have a successful fantasy season. Profar may enter the year as baseball’s best prospect, but does that mean anything for his fantasy value?
When the Kansas City Royals dealt Wil Myers this offseason, people began rehashing the “prospects are unknown quantities” argument. And while you shouldn’t use that argument to try and justify a trade, the statement is absolutely true. Some prospects, even elite ones, fail. If we really had to put a number on whether a prospect will be successful, it’s probably 60/40, as Dave Cameron explained shortly after the Myers trade. The study that Dave cited looked at how prospects performed over their career. It’s much more difficult for a prospect to come up and add value during their rookie season. But the top overall prospect should be the best equipped to immediately experience success, in most cases. If that’s true, then they would probably have a much higher success rate during their rookie year.
Using the data I researched from my FG+ piece, I looked at how every number one overall prospect on Baseball America’s list performed during their rookie year.
| Name | Year | Team | AB | HR | R | RBI | SB | AVG | value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bryce Harper | 2012 | Nationals | 533 | 22 | 98 | 59 | 18 | 0.270 | 13.13 |
| Harper | 2011 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Jason Heyward | 2010 | Braves | 520 | 18 | 83 | 72 | 11 | 0.277 | 11.04 |
| Matt Wieters | 2009 | Orioles | 354 | 9 | 35 | 43 | 0.288 | -2.53 | |
| Jay Bruce | 2008 | Reds | 413 | 21 | 63 | 52 | 4 | 0.254 | -1.56 |
| Daisuke Matsuzaka | 2007 | Red Sox | 204.2 | 15 | 4.40 | 1.32 | 201 | 13.24 | |
| Delmon Young | 2006 | Devil Rays | 126 | 3 | 16 | 10 | 2 | 0.317 | -16.68 |
| Joe Mauer | 2005 | Twins | 489 | 9 | 61 | 55 | 13 | 0.294 | 9.09 |
| Joe Mauer | 2004 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Mark Teixeira | 2003 | Rangers | 529 | 26 | 66 | 84 | 1 | 0.259 | 5.52 |
| Josh Beckett | 2002 | Marlins | 104.2 | 6 | 4.21 | 1.31 | 110 | 1.03 | |
| Josh Hamilton | 2001 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Rick Ankiel | 2000 | Cardinals | 173.0 | 11 | 3.54 | 1.29 | 192 | 19.06 | |
| J.D. Drew | 1999 | Cardinals | 368 | 13 | 72 | 39 | 19 | 0.242 | -3.88 |
| Ben Grieve | 1998 | Athletics | 583 | 18 | 94 | 89 | 2 | 0.288 | 8.60 |
| Andruw Jones | 1997 | Braves | 399 | 18 | 60 | 70 | 20 | 0.231 | 1.57 |
| Andruw Jones | 1996 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Alex Rodriguez | 1995 | Mariners | 142 | 5 | 15 | 19 | 4 | 0.232 | |
| Cliff Floyd | 1994 | Expos | 334 | 4 | 43 | 41 | 10 | 0.281 | |
| Chipper Jones | 1993 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Brien Taylor | 1992 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Todd Van Poppel | 1991 | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP | DNP |
| Steve Avery | 1990 | Braves | 97.0 | 3 | 5.47 | 1.66 | 75 | -10.69 |
*The value column is based on Zach Sanders’ fantasy system. Basically, every player that posted a positive value would have been a useful fantasy asset the entire season. You’ll notice that there are no values for 1994 and 1995. That is due to the strike. If we were to take an educated guess, Alex Rodriguez’s lack of playing time would have kept him from producing positive value. Cliff Floyd probably didn’t do enough with his at-bats to warrant a positive value either.
We’re dealing with a small sample here, so keep that in consideration when reading from here. That list gives us some interesting talking points. For one, most top overall prospects see a decent amount of playing time right away. Outside of Alex Rodriguez and Delmon Young, every hitter on the list received, at least, 300 at-bats. The same can be said about pitchers, though we only have a sample of four players.
You’ll also notice that in 23 years, seven number one prospects did not play in the majors in the season immediately following their number one ranking. But looking deeper at the numbers, you can see that three of those seven, Bryce Harper, Andruw Jones and Joe Mauer, were named the top overall prospect in consecutive years. Those three players are some of the most talented prospects in recent memory, and were recognized as such before they even had a shot to compete for a major league job. The next guy on that list, Josh Hamilton, likely would have seen time if not for his drug use. We do see three straight years where the top prospect didn’t receive enough at-bats to lose their prospect status, and those came from 1991 to 1993. That may say something about teams being slightly more skeptical and protective of their prospects in the early-90s. That seemed to change quickly, as most top prospects receive playing time early.
The chart also reveals that top prospects have a good chance of being fantasy relevant during their rookie seasons. Of the 14 players to receive significant time, nine of them produced a positive value during their rookie year. Only five players produced a negative value, one of whom was Delmon Young, who didn’t get the playing time needed to carve out fantasy relevance. These guys are named the top prospect because they have immense talent, and, for the most part, those guys live up to their expectations right away.
In Profar’s case, the biggest issue preventing him from playing is that he has no clear path at a starting role. But as we’ve seen with most of the teams in this study, top overall prospects tend to force their way into playing time. And in the case of Young, who didn’t get playing time, his team was in no position to rush him, as they weren’t going to compete that year.
The Rangers should be in contention this season, and that could make them more eager to get Profar into their lineup. It’s not a sure thing that Profar is able to get enough playing time to matter this season, which could mean that he’s not worth a pick on draft day unless that changes. But if he’s still on the waiver wire and he gets the call mid-season, he’s definitely worth an immediate pickup based on how other top overall prospects have performed.
Chris is a blogger for CBSSports.com. He has also contributed to Sports on Earth, the 2013 Hard Ball Times Baseball Annual, ESPN, FanGraphs and RotoGraphs. He tries to be funny on twitter @Chris_Cwik.
Since Profar will probably carry both SS and 2B eligibility, he may be a good choice late on draft day if you drafted Zobrist for either a 2B or SS slot early. Always nice to have positional flexibility throughout the year at those spots to sit guys that are slumping, without having to backfill from the waiver wire wasteland.
If you miss getting one of the top 2B’s or SS’s, I’d be pretty happy drafting Zobrist in the 40’s-50’s, R. Weeks in the 100’s, Profar in a late round, and keep an eye on some dark horse sleepers (J. Weeks, Ackley, Johnson, Drew) potentially on the waiver wire if it looks like they’re stepping up. That allows you to spend your early round picks on more sure bets at 1B and 3B, which to me don’t look like they have as many waiver wire surprise candidates.
Any more info on that “Value” calculation? I would like that column for my own rankings. Thanks.
It’s not hard to get a quick and dirty one yourself: divide HR, SB, and xH (see below) by one and RBI and R by 3; then find the 120th best hitter (in a 12 team league with 10 hitters per roster, adjust for your league size). His value is replacement level, so subtract his value from everyone else’s. Then find the 12th best catcher, if his value is negative, add his value times -1 to every catcher’s value. This gets you positional value for catchers. You can repeat this for SS and 2B and 3B, which sometimes don’t fall in the top 120 guys.
A similar procedure is used for pitchers, but I can’t remember default divisors.
The divisors above can be calculated more carefully in different ways. Some people suggest using the slope of a regression line between league standing and point value, others using an iterative procedure and a standard deviation.
xH = AB*(player batting average – fantasy league average batting average). It basically counts how many hits hits a player contributes that will improve your team above the league average. Obviously, this can be negative, but these scores are all on interval scales, so only the differences between the values mean anything.
I calculate a value number a bit differently, based on quotas I want to acheive for the various stats in my H2H league.
I calculate a ceiling (~90th percentile) and floor (replacement level) for each category. For instance for Runs, ceiling = 90, floor = 50. Then for each stat I calculate a player’s ratio:
([stat] – floor) / (ceiling – floor)
For rate stats, I normalize to 650 plate appearances (multiply by player projected plate appearances, divided by 650).
Then I sum them all together. I compare to “replacement” at each position, figuring out an average value I could probably pick up on the waiver wire at each position.
On the contrary, if the Rangers are in contention, they may be must LESS eager to get Profar into their lineup. Barring injury, most contending teams are loath to turn over the reins to rookies. Just look at what the Rangers did with Profar last year for a good example.
Yeah, the Nats and the Angels followed this advice last year, much to their chagrin.
Like Andruw Jones, Profar’s defense played a big part in him being ranked #1. Even if he finds regular playing time it’s questionable whether or not he’ll have enough immediate offensive impact to match the inevitable hype.
I think you took the wrong lesson from that Chipper Jones / Todd Van Poppel / Brien Taylor trio. The lesson there should actually be “prospects used to be evaluated differently.”
Van Poppel earned his number 1 ranking after a grand total of 37 2/3 innings of low-A ball. Taylor received that number 1 ranking never having thrown a professional pitch — it was based solely on his high school stats, as he signed too late to pitch in rookie ball. Chipper Jones needed time to move from shortstop to third base.
The proper lesson there is that, twenty years ago, prospects were rated based on how high their ceiling appeared to be rather than on how likely they were to reach it. Taylor and Van Poppel actually had a lot to do with how those re-evaluations ended up being made — EVERYBODY who ever saw Taylor pitch continues to say to this day that he was the best pitching prospect they’d ever seen, but all the talent in the world won’t save you from destroying your arm in a bar fight.
I have been thinking about this article for far longer than is probably recommended. I think the method in addressing this question is flawed.
First, the sample size is small and drawn out over such a large time that it is difficult to trust the data. I think looking at the top 5-10 prospects from a given year/list gives a better sample, and limiting it to the past 10 years would be better than looking back at years where player evaluation was very different.
Also, ignoring the ‘did not play’ results is problematic. fantasy owners spending a draft pick or waiver claim on a top prospect are doing so assuming he will play, and rare is the opportunity where no one else in the league is aware that a top prospect just got called up and you can lay first claim on him cheap. MDC is showing profar and myers both with an ADP near 250, meaning these guys are being picked up in late rounds even without the promise of playing time. I think the difference between a waiver claim on a top prospect and a draft pick on the same before spring training is a pretty radical difference in valuation.
Finally, whether or not a top prospect should be expected to produce positive value, unless we’re understanding HOW to value that prospect it’s not really useful info. Your conclusion is that 9 of the top prospects from the past 23 years did produce value in the year they were listed as no. 1. You explain that you think this represents top prospects will likely produce right away, which is fair, but the range of how much they produce is so extreme that true evaluation is really difficult, and not clearly clean-cut. As such, I draw an entirely different conclusion than you lay out: looking at this sample, even guaranteed playing time makes the odds of the prospect putting up value is about 65%, and the value could range from just above replacement to extremely valuable. It’s true that occasionally the top prospect will produce extreme value if you get them very cheap, but the odds are still against that happening.
A larger sample size may prove you right and me wrong, but I don’t think this article fully justifies the conclusion you reach based on the data presented.
Just returning to say I read your fg+ article and it answered a lot of my questions/concerns. I recommend it highly
Yahoo gave Wil Myers Catcher eligibility. How much does that drive up his draft day value? Expecially in a one C format, I’d be tempted to take him and then shuffle the hot hand in and out off waivers until his call up.