Over the next week or so, I will be running a series of strategy articles to help prepare for your fantasy drafts. Please feel free to post any questions or ideas in the comments section.

Have a plan – and don’t stick to it.

To be successful in a fantasy draft, you need to have a plan. You need to have some idea of the players that you want to take, and know the approximate values of everyone, so you can spot value wherever it may be. You may even want to have a more specific strategy, such as punting a category or concentrating on stocking your team in several categories. However, as important as any plan may be, it’s just as important to know when to abandon your plan.

Let’s say that your strategy is to load up on starting pitching, because you feel that there are very few really high quality starters available, and if you can corner the market everyone else is going to have to dig through the scrap heap to fill out their roster. As such, you plan on taking three or four ace level starters in a row, starting in the second round. Well, let’s say that right after you select your first ace, the next three teams all select aces as well. Suddenly, there are very few other aces available, and if you want to stick to your strategy it would require you to draft non-ace level pitchers in the next several rounds. In other words, you’d have to overdraft pitchers to be able to carry out your plan.

In this situation (or any other similar situation), even though you had a plan, you must switch courses immediately. The best fantasy players are people with plans and the ability to adapt instantly should their plans be thwarted. If you understand the dynamic of any draft, you will be able to exploit it. In this particular example, starting pitchers are being overvalued, and there are bound to be some players who are not being valued appropriately. Rather than playing along with everyone else and drafting pitchers too soon, you should adapt your strategy to exploit whatever is now undervalued – perhaps it’s steals, power, or saves. Whatever it is, if you identify the market in your draft, you can work it to your advantage.

While it’s vitally important to know as many players as possible, it’s just as important to be flexible and adapt to whatever surprising things may happen during your draft. Drafts can be won or lost on this skill alone.

Arizona Diamondbacks right-hander Brandon Webb generates ground balls. A lot of them. In fact, the University of Kentucky product lapped the competition in terms of burning worms in 2008, with a 3.15 GB/FB ratio (second place went to free agent Derek Lowe, at a distant 2.63 to one).

With so many of Webb’s offerings being pounded into the infield dirt, the D-Backs’ co-ace will often require the services of his infielders to convert those grounders into outs. Let’s take a look at Arizona’s projected starting infield for the 2009 season, with their 2008 and career UZR/150 ratings at their respective positions:

1B Conor Jackson: 4.4 UZR/150 in ’08, -1.6 UZR/150 career
2B Felipe Lopez: -7.9 UZR/150 in ’08, -4.4 UZR/150 career
SS Stephen Drew: -14.5 UZR/150 in ’08, -13.5 UZR/150 career
3B Mark Reynolds: -2.2 UZR/150 in ’08, -4.6 UZR/150 career

Yuck. Arizona’s projected infield rated as 20.2 runs below average per 150 games last season, and the career totals are even worse: -24.1 runs below per 150 contests. If these guys continue to flash leaden leather, Webb might not be on speaking terms with his infielders by May. Granted, the 29 year-old posted a .297 BABIP with Drew and Reynolds on the left side of the infield and Jackson occasionally at first in 2008, but it’s still disconcerting that such a groundball-centric pitcher will reside in front of four below-average defenders.

Over the past few weeks, I have discussed the importance of context when evaluating pitchers. Whether it be Texas’ similarly lagging fielding prowess or Seattle’s new incredibly rangy outfield, the quality of the defenders behind a pitcher can make a noticeable impact on his performance. When a batter puts the ball in play, the pitcher is fairly dependent upon his fielders to convert that ball into an out. When those defenders struggle to do so, that pitcher is going to surrender some hits and runs that he really shouldn’t have.

Luckily with Webb, the pitcher in question here also possesses excellent controllable skills that aren’t subject to the caprices of his defense. With a 2.82 K/BB ratio and few home runs surrendered, Webb posted a 3.28 FIP this past season. Webb is undoubtedly an excellent starter deserving of a high draft pick. But, it is worth noting that the fielders behind him aren’t especially adept and might cause his stat line to look a little worse than it should.

Over the past few years, Sports Illustrated writer Tom Verducci has compiled a list of starting pitchers that he considers to be particularly risky heading into the next season. Verducci’s list is based on the concept that a young starter (age 25 or below) is at an increased risk of injury if he surpasses his innings pitched total from the previous season by 30 frames or more. As he so often does, Verducci summed up his reasoning in a very articulate manner:

“Why can’t they throw 200 innings? Simply put, they’re not conditioned for it yet. It’s like training for a marathon. You need to build stamina incrementally. The unofficial industry standard is that no young pitcher should throw more than 30 more innings than he did the previous season. It’s a general rule of thumb, and one I’ve been tracking for about a decade. When teams violate the incremental safeguard, it’s amazing how often they pay for it.”

Just as a runner must build up strength and endurance over a gradual period of time, a hurler must incrementally boost his workload, lest his arm suffer the pitching equivalent of a cold-turkey 26.2 mile run. The list of talented youngsters who have seemingly fallen victim to the “Verducci Effect” is both sizable and significant. Among those who crossed the 30+ threshold in 2005 and 2006 were Francisco Liriano, Gustavo Chacin, Adam Loewen, Scott Mathieson and Anibal Sanchez. Here’s a look at the list of seven guys that Verducci identified as high-risk entering 2008:

Ian Kennedy, +61 IP

5.45 FIP, 26 BB in 39.2 major league innings, DL stint for a strained right lat.

Fausto Carmona, +56.1 IP

0.83 K/BB ratio in 120.2 IP, DL stint for a left hip strain.

Ubaldo Jimenez, +41.2 IP

No problems here– Jimenez posted a very nice 3.83 FIP.

Tom Gorzelanny, +40.1 IP

Gorzelanny was an absolute mess this past season, with a 6.35 FIP, a demotion to the minors and a DL stint for a left middle finger injury.

Dustin McGowan, +38.2 IP

McGowan’s ascent was curtailed by a shoulder injury that required season-ending surgery.

Chad Gaudin, +36 IP

Gaudin posted a pretty solid 4.14 FIP, but he did take a trip to the DL in the spring for a nagging hip injury.

Yovani Gallardo, +33 IP

Gallardo also suffered a serious injury in ’08, but his was of the traumatic sort, as he tore his ACL covering first base at Wrigley Field. It’s hard to pin that on anything but bad luck.

So, out of the seven identified, five served DL stints that seem related to the increased workload, and Kennedy, Carmona and Gorzelanny endured nightmarish seasons. Jimenez was really the only one to come out unscathed, though Gallardo’s health issues certainly seem unrelated.

With the rule of 30 in mind, let’s take a look at a preliminary list of young starters who fall under the “Verducci Effect” for 2009. For the purposes of this list, I excluded pitchers who missed all of 2007 due to injury (such as Liriano), and included only those pitchers who will be 25 or younger on opening day 2009. I wanted to compile a list of guys pitching both seasons, who saw a big jump in IP from ’07 to ’08.

There is also some debate as to how much minor league innings should be “weighed” in the equation. There are some who feel that minor league frames are not as high stress as major league innings, but I have decided to count them as equal here.

Dana Eveland (age 25), +151.1 IP

Eveland tossed just 37.2 innings in 2007 while in the D-Backs’ minor league system, as he dealt with a finger injury. The hefty lefty appeared to tire down the stretch, as he surrendered a .311/.379/.468 line after the all-star break.

Gregory Reynolds
(23), +74.2 IP

Also known as “the guy picked before Evan Longoria“, this Stanford product already hit the minor league DL with a shoulder impingement in July.

Gregory Smith (24, soon 25), +74.1 IP

There are already plenty of reasons to expect this LSU product to trend downward next season, and the big increase in innings won’t help.

Charlie Morton (25), +74 IP

Jon Lester (25), +74 IP

Lester is admittedly a unique case, and it’s hard to say whether or not he faces the same injury risk as some of these other guys or not. For what it’s worth, Lester was sitting 90-91 MPH with his fastball in the early months of the season, but was firing 94 MPH bullets by the time September rolled around.

Cole Hamels (24), +72.1 IP

Hamels was no stranger to injury coming up through the Phillies’ farm system, and a whopping 35 postseason innings gave him a combined 262.1 frames tossed during the 2008 season. He’s incredibly gifted, but his health does bear watching.

Chad Billingsley (24), +65.1 IP

Chad beat the rule of 30 to the punch, as he unfortunately slipped on some ice and broke his leg outside of his Pennsylvania home (which begs the question, if you work in LA, why live in Pennsylvania?)

John Danks (23), +62.2 IP

Danks took some huge strides forward in 2008, but he’ll have to combat a big innings increase to maintain his status as one of the better starters in the American League.

Matt Harrison (23), +51 IP

Tim Lincecum (24), +49.2 IP

Giants manager Bruce Bochy did not seem to use much discretion with Lincecum in ’08, bringing him back into a game after a lengthy rain delay and allowing him to toss at least 110 pitches in 18 of his 33 starts. We’ve all heard the arguments of Lincecum’s “rubber arm” and freakishness, but Tim racked up the highest Pitcher Abuse Points score by a wide margin, and accumulated such a lofty workload for a cellar-dweller. From a cost/benefit standpoint, was it really worth pushing the guy so hard?

Mike Pelfrey (24, soon 25), +48 IP

Pelfrey improved his control in ’08 (2.87 BB/9), though the 6-7 righty continued to post finesse-type strikeout numbers (4.93 per nine innings). Is a fastball-centric pitcher like Pelfrey (81.2% usage), who rarely snaps off a slider or a curve, less likely to feel the effects of a big increase in innings? Thoughts?

Peter will have more on Pelfrey in the coming days.

Clayton Kershaw (20, soon 21), +47 IP

The Dodgers have tried to be careful with their big southpaw who comes equipped with mid-90’s gas and a devastating slow curve, but Kershaw still crossed the innings threshold by a decent margin. Considering his age and enormous importance to the franchise, expect Kershaw to be kept on a pretty strict innings limit in 2009.

Jair Jurrjens (22, soon 23), +45 IP

Jurrjens was solid for Atlanta this past season. He did have some shoulder issues in the minors, however, and tossed nearly 190 frames in 2008.

Matt Garza (25), +38.1 IP

Garza’s 25 postseason innings pushed him into Verducci territory.

Brandon Morrow (24), +32 IP

Because he was strangely pigeonholed in the bullpen for the better part of two seasons, this 2006 first-rounder has not been given the opportunity to gradually build up his arm strength in the minors. The Mariners began to transition Morrow into a starter last season, and new management seems to be going ahead with the plan. If Morrow begins the season in the rotation, he is going to soar past the 95.1 innings he threw in 2008. This situation calls to mind the Joba Chamberlain conundrum from last season. Of course, none of this would be an issue had Morrow been given the development time and innings necessary to incrementally increase his workload.

That’s the list: 15 in all. It’s important to point out that this is just one piece of evidence to take into account when evaluating a starter’s expected level of performance in the coming season. This is not a hard and fast rule; there are exceptions. However, it is an interesting and useful tool, as the risk of injury does seem to climb as a young starter gets beyond that 30 inning rule. By no means should you shy away from some of the top-tier performers on this list. Just keep in mind that their respective workloads did increase greatly, and it wouldn’t be unprecedented if injury or attrition set in for some of these guys in 2009.

Reliever wins are.

Consider this: Jose Arredondo won 10 games last season in 61 innings. How rare is that? Well it’s the fewest amount of innings for any pitcher to win 10 games in baseball history. Only 103 pitchers have pitched in 100 or less innings and won 10 games, and only 15 since 2000. Here’s a look at those pitchers:

Arthur Rhodes: 10 (69.7 IP in 2002)
Luis Ayala: 10 (71 IP in 2003)
Aaron Small: 10 (76 IP in 2005)
Joe Nathan: 12 (79 IP in 2003)
Jesse Crain:12 (79.7 IP in 2005)
Juan Rincon: 11 (82 IP in 2004)
Paul Quantrill: 11 (83 IP in 2001)
Gabe White: 11 (83 IP in 2000)
Tony Fiore: 10 (91 IP in 2002)
Danny Graves: 10 (91.3 IP in 2000)
Scot Shields: 10 (91.7 IP in 2005)
Billy Koch: 11 (93.7 IP in 2002)
Shigetoshi Hasegawa: 10 (95.7 IP in 2000)
Oscar Villarreal: 10 (98 IP in 2003)

What’s up with all the Minnesota Twins on that list anyways? Here’s how they fared the next year:

Rhodes: 3 W 54 IP
Ayala: 6 W 90.3 IP
Small: 0 W 27.7 IP
Nathan: 1 W 72.3 IP
Crain: 4 W 76.7 IP
Rincon: 6 W 77 IP
Quantrill: 5 W 76.7 IP
White: 1 W 67.7 IP
Fiore: 1 W 36 IP
Graves: 6 W 80.3 IP
Shields: 7 W 87.7 IP
Koch: 5 W 53 IP
Hasegawa: 5 W 55.7 IP
Villarreal: 0 W 18 IP

The lesson here is to not rely on relievers for wins. Arredondo could present saves next season, but on draft day don’t be fooled by his shiny win totals, otherwise you might be in for a rude awakening.

The 2008 Seattle Mariners were, in many ways, difficult to watch. With a payroll in excess of $100 million, the M’s managed to lose 101 ballgames. Richie Sexson and Jose Vidro were compensated handsomely to do their best Mario Mendoza impressions, and shaky fielding behind some, ahem, questionable free agent starters only made matters worse. The M’s checked in at -32.8 UZR in ’08, ranking 24th in the majors. Combine mediocre hitting, pitching and fielding, and you have a high-priced disaster.

However, those grim days may very well be in the rear view mirror. The M’s unceremoniously dumped Bill Bavasi and company, bringing in well-regarded talent procurer Jack Zduriencik, who helped draft and develop Milwaukee’s extensive list of gifted youngsters. Jack Z has wasted little time altering his roster, signing a cheap and potentially useful first base platoon (Russell Branyan and Chris Shelton) and then pulling off a mind-bending 12-player trade that netted him seven players. Among those seven are Franklin Gutierrez and Endy Chavez, two of the rangiest outfielders in the game today.

The current Mariner’s depth chart features Chavez in left field, Gutierrez in center and Ichiro Suzuki in right. Suffice it to say, that group would go a long way toward improving Seattle’s lackluster defensive showing. Let’s see how the outfield fared in ’08 using UZR/150 (the number of runs above or below average a fielder is per 150 games) and John Dewan’s Plus/Minus system:

2008

Raul Ibanez (LF): -11 UZR/150, -18 Plus/Minus
Ichiro Suzuki (CF): 3.3 UZR/150, -9 Plus/Minus
Suzuki (RF): -0.2 UZR/150, +12 Plus/Minus
Wladimir Balentien (CF): -1.7 UZR/150, -2 Plus/Minus
Balentien (RF): -17.4 UZR, -3 Plus/Minus

I just listed the players seeing the most time in the outfield. As a team , The M’s outfield compiled:

LF: -14.9 UZR (-14.9 runs), -21 +/- (-16.8 runs)
CF: -3.4 UZR (-3.4 runs), -12 +/- (-9.6 runs)
RF: -7.2 UZR (-7.2 runs), +14 +/- (+11.2 runs)

As a whole, the M’s outfield was -25.5 runs below average by UZR and -15.2 runs by the Plus/Minus system (the big difference in RF is due to Dewan’s system liking Ichiro’s work there and UZR rating it as slightly below average).

Now, take a gander at the new-look Seattle D. For the sake of making this comparison easier, let’s assume that:
1. Chavez, Gutierrez and Suzuki all make 150 starts and play 1350 innings apiece.
2. The fielding metrics compiled by Gutierrez are docked 15% (it’s far from perfect, but it’s an attempt to account for the added difficulty of playing center), and Chavez and Suzuki play to the levels that they have shown in the corner spots during their respective careers. For Chavez, I added his equally stellar work in RF to his projection to make the sample size larger (the majority of his career has been spent in center).

LF Chavez: 20.3 UZR/150
CF Gutierrez: 18.3 UZR/150
RF Suzuki: 7.3 UZR/150

If this trio plays 150 games, they project to be nearly 46 runs above average with the leather. Compare that with the embarrassing work done by last year’s Ibanez-fueled, molasses-covered group: if the M’s get league-average defense from their extra outfielders (filling out the additional 12 game gap), that’s a swing of over 70 runs in outfield defense, or seven wins (!)

Keep Seattle’s insanely rangy outfield in mind on draft day, particularly when it comes to flyball-centric hurler Brandon Morrow (career 34.2 GB%). Great defense can make pitchers look a whole lot better, and the M’s new outfield projects to have a Tampa Bay-type turnaround in quality with three legitimate center fielders covering the gaps.

Batting average is a fickle statistic. Perhaps more than any other metric in the game, batting average is subject to the caprices of lucky (or unlucky) bounces here or there. A player with the skill level of a .300 hitter may find himself hitting 20 to 30 points above or below that number, and it wouldn’t really be considered all that unusual. A player may seem to be experiencing a “down” season, but it might be more the product of poor luck on balls in play than any massive downturn in talent level.

Which brings us to Robinson Cano. Over his four seasons in the major leagues, the Yankees second baseman has seen his performance vary by a considerable amount. Here are his WPA/LI numbers from 2005-2008, with his rank among second baseman in parentheses:

2005: -0.19 (14/15 among qualified 2B)
2006: 1.08 (4/23)
2007: 0.38 (13/26)
2008: -1.31 (17/18)

Cano’s performance has taken over a two-win swing since 2006, from a win above average to 1.3 below this past season. This would be suggestive of a change in skill level, but when we dig a little deeper into Cano’s numbers, not all that much has changed. Below are his batting lines over the past four seasons. Pay particularly close attention to the last number listed:

2005: .297/.320/.458, 3 BB%, 13 K%, .161 ISO, 20.6 LD%, .320 BABIP
2006: .342/.365/.525, 3.6 BB%, 11.2 K%, .183 ISO, 19.9 LD%, .363 BABIP
2007: .306/.353/.488, 5.9 BB%, 13.8 K%, .182 ISO, 16.9 LD%, .331 BABIP
2008: .271/.305/.410, 4.2 BB%, 10.9 K%, .139 ISO, 19.4 LD%, .286 BABIP

In terms of his controllable skills, there’s not a whole lot of difference between these four years, save for a bit of a dip in ISO this past season. Cano has established himself as a player who very rarely walks, makes a lot of contact and has a little more pop that the average middle infielder. What has fueled Cano’s varied performances is his batting average on balls in play (BABIP). Cano had a ton of bounces go his way during his .342 year in 2006, but very few auspicious hops this past season, when he batted just .271.

Given Cano’s 19.4 LD% in 2008, we would expect his BABIP to come in around .314 instead of his actual .286 mark (LD% + .120 gives us expected BABIP; .194 + .120= .314). Adjusting for that difference, Cano’s 2008 line “should” have been about .299/.333/.438. If we adjust for the BABIP variance in his other seasons as well, we can get a more approximate level of Cano’s talent:

2005: .320 BABIP, .326 Expected BABIP. Revised Line: .303/.326/.464, .790 OPS (.778 actual)
2006: .363 BABIP, .319 Expected BABIP. Revised Line: .298/.321/.481, .802 OPS (.890 actual)
2007: .331 BABIP, .289 Expected BABIP. Revised Line: .264/.311/.446, .757 OPS (.841 actual)
2008: .286 BABIP, .314 Expected BABIP. Revised Line: .299/.333/.438, .771 OPS (.715 actual)

Over this four-year period, the difference Between Cano’s highest and lowest actual OPS is 175 points. Once we adjust for the vagaries of balls put in play, however, the gap between his largest and smallest OPS is 45 points. In other words, Cano’s skill level hasn’t really varied all that much over this time frame: he’s about a .300/.325/.460-type hitter.

This exercise with Cano is an example of why batting average-dependent players are so risky. When a player derives a significant portion of his value from his average (which can vary drastically from year-to-year), it becomes extremely difficult to predict what sort of season that player will have. As we have seen with Cano, a .300-level hitter can show similar controllable skills yet have his batting average swing from .342 to .271. Unfortunately, it appears as though fantasy owners are going to have to continue to ride this roller coaster with Cano, as his plate discipline hasn’t shown much improvement through the years:

Outside Swing Percentage (O-Swing%), 2005-2008:

2005: 25.6%
2006: 30.8%
2007: 34.4%
2008: 30.7%

One of our new statistical toys, First Pitch Strike Percentage (F-Swing%), also serves to show Cano’s iffy plate approach. Cano had a first-pitch strike called against him 62.6% of the time in 2008, 11th-highest in the majors among qualified batters.

Such are the perils of drafting Robinson Cano. He’s plenty valuable if he’s hitting .300+, but he’s a cipher if he bats .270. If you’re going to invest in Cano, just realize that predicting his performance level is much trickier than it is for most other batters.