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Strategy Session – Patience is a Virtue

The season is long. Players go through peaks and slumps. BE PATIENT.

Too many times fantasy players get worried or frustrated and make stupid decisions. For example, last season I traded Adam Wainwright for CC Sabathia, straight up, in April. Wainwright was pitching well and I had high hopes for him, but CC was CC, even though he had been terrible. CC’s owner panicked and dealt him for a solid pitcher, but I was able to take advantage and Sabathia pitched extremely well for me during the rest of the season.

Of course, this is a rather dramatic example. Often times, the more telling examples are knowing when to drop decent players who are in slumps, or knowing when to pick up mediocre players who are hitting well. In general, the best piece of advice is to ignore how a player has performed over the last few weeks, and instead focus on how they have performed over the last few years, as this is a far better predictor of future performance. Bad players can be very good over a few weeks or months, and great players can be very bad. Occasionally a player will come out of nowhere to have a fantastic season – Ryan Ludwick, for example – but this is the exception, rather than the rule. You may miss out on Ryan Ludwick, but it’s worth it to avoid the flash-in-the-pan guys who will fizzle the instant you add them to your roster.

Similarly, there are certainly players who go through season-long funks – like Nick Swisher – but most of the time people with established track records bounce back in the midst of what appears to be a disappointing season. For example, AJ Burnett had a 5.42 ERA on June 19. Many people may have dumped him at that point – but smart players understood that his peripherals were still good (90/46 K/BB ratio in 91 innings), and that Burnett had a track record of success. Owners who held on to Burnett were rewarded, as he had a 3.12 ERA (and 141 strikeouts) over the rest of the season.

When in doubt, defer to a player’s established track record, not their most recent success or failure. And read Rotographs, as we’ll attempt to help you decipher whether a player’s recent play represents a true never level of ability (for better or worse), or is just the fluke of a small sample size.

Corey Patterson? Really?

Hear me out.

Yeah, I know. Corey Patterson redefined the word awful last year. He was abysmal. Atrocious. Embarrassing. But you should still keep a close eye on him in 2009.

Patterson is a unique player: he is much better in fantasy baseball than he is in real life, thanks to his combination of power, speed, and lack of OBP. Last season, Patterson hit a disastrous .205/.238/.344 in 366 at bats for the Reds, but still somehow managed to hit 10 homers and steal 14 bases. Of course, these homer and SB totals do not justify the terrible batting average. But there is hope for the future.

Patterson’s expected BABIP last year (according to a new model I introduced []) was .262. His actual BABIP was a mere .210. The ~24% difference between expected and actual BABIP was the second-highest difference of all qualifying players (behind only Brandon Inge). If we credit Patterson for his “lost” hits, his overall batting average rises to .248. Still not great, but certainly far more palatable than .205.

Interestingly, Patterson’s walk rate in 2008 was right in line with his career rate (granted, that career rate is terribly low, but still), and his strikeout rate was almost 7% below his career average. His line-drive/ground ball/fly ball splits were well within reason and nothing else seems very strange about his season. Furthermore, he was 28 for most of the year (he turned 29 in August), suggesting that age-related decline is unlikely. It appears that Patterson simply suffered from a tremendous amount of bad luck.

If that is indeed the case, it follows that Patterson is likely to bounce back from it in 2009. Or, stated more accurately, Patterson’s poor 2008 season doesn’t make it more likely that he will also struggle in 2009. Don’t forget: as recently as 2006 and 2007, Patterson was a fantasy stud: he hit .276 and .269 those years, and totaled 24 homers and 82 steals in 267 games. Patterson’s career batting average is .253, and he has 182 career steals.

Unfortunately for Patterson, he accepted a minor league deal with the Nationals and an invitation to spring training. Jim Bowden has a particular fondness for outfielders, and the Nationals currently have Elijah Dukes, Lastings Milledge, Austin Kearns, Wily Mo Pena, Josh Willingham and Willie Harris. Even if Patterson returns to form, there’s almost no way he vaults ahead of three of those guys on the depth chart to make the team, let alone accumulate significant at bats.

However, there’s always room on some for a toolsy player who can play a mean center field. This is the exact type of player that sets the great fantasy owners apart from the good ones – Patterson can be had off of the waiver wire in just about every league, and if he gets even semi-regular playing time he will almost certainly rack up enough stolen bases to help you.

Keep your eye very closely on Corey Patterson.

What to Make of McCutchen

Andrew McCutchen is a top prospect. Baseball Prospectus’s Kevin Goldstein rated him as a five-star prospect, second in the Pirates system to Pedro Alvarez. Similarly, Baseball America ranked him as the Pirates best prospect heading into the 2008 season. McCutchen spent 2008 at triple-A, and may be poised for a call up to the majors. Let’s look at what to expect from him from a fantasy perspective.

McCutchen was only 21 years old in 2008, but played the entire year at triple-A. Therefore, his line of .283/.372/.398 is actually a lot more impressive than it looks. Age is a crucially important factor in determining a prospect’s status, and any 21-year-old who can simply hold his own in triple-A is well ahead of the game. Although McCutchen didn’t show much power, a .372 OBP is quite a feat for someone so young.

However, McCutchen had an underwhelming line in double-A in 2007 as well, hitting .258/.327/.383. Again, he was only 20 at the time, so his line is a lot more impressive than it looks. Still, that’s two straight underwhelming seasons – so why is he even worth writing about?

Three reasons: first of all, McCutchen is probably a lot better than his lines from 2007 and 2008 showed; secondly, he is very likely to get called to the majors in 2009; finally, he could contribute to your fantasy team right away.

I’ve covered the idea that McCutchen is better than his lines showed – scouts love him, and he was so young for his level that simply being decent is quite an achievement. Furthermore, he has shown consistent improvement in both his walk rate and strikeout rate since 2006 – his walk rate has risen every year (even though he’s played against tougher competition), and his strikeout rate has fallen. Again, this is doubly impressive considering that McCutchen has moved up a level each year and is still so young.

Furthermore, the Pirates have an opening in center field. Yes, I know that Nate McLouth played there last season, hit quite well and even won a Gold Glove. However, simply put, McLouth is not even an average defensive center fielder – he was a whopping 40 plays below average (last among qualified “center fielders”), according to John Dewan’s numbers. Even if he’s not quite that bad in center, McLouth should hit enough to man a corner, and McCutchen is supposedly an above-average defender. Center field is McCutchen’s for the taking, and he should grab it some point in 2009.

Finally, McCutchen is an excellent long-term prospect, and many believe that he will develop power to complement his speed, defense, and improving plate discipline. However, his career slugging percentage in the minors is .414, and he’s hit a total of 39 homers in 462 career games. Therefore, it’s fair to surmise that while power may come in the future, he’s probably not going to hit 25 homers at the major league level in 2009.

However, McCutchen may be able to help you in the steals department. He stole 34 bases in 135 games in 2008, and even though he was caught 18 times, he’s only been caught 25% of the time he’s attempted a steal in the minors. In other words, McCutchen is probably an efficient enough base stealer that the Pirates won’t hesitate to turn him loose on the base paths.

Furthermore, McCutchen’s improving strikeout- and walk-rates suggest that he may be able to maintain a respectable batting average (and OBP) in the majors. The BA would help you for obvious reasons, but the OBP will help him get more opportunities to steal bases (and score runs).

McCutchen is unlikely to break camp with the team, and I’d guess that the Pirates are savvy enough (and far enough out of contention) so as to wait until late May or early June to bring McCutchen to the majors, thereby preventing him from attaining Super Two status in three years. He’s probably not going to make enough of an impact to make him draft-worthy in shallow mixed leagues (although those of you who play in leagues like this may want to snatch him up if/when he does get the call to the majors). However, anyone in deeper mixed leagues or NL Only leagues may want to stash him on your bench, as McCutchen could be an excellent source of steals when he finally gets called to the big leagues.

And for those of you in keeper leagues, there are few better long-term prospects than Andrew McCutchen.

Strategy Session – Beneficial Ballparks

By now, many fantasy players are familiar with park effects. It’s easier to hit a home run in Colorado than in San Diego. Seattle is tough on right handed hitters, but Texas is great for lefties. Etc.

Even though park effects are widely known and considered, they can still be exploited in many fantasy leagues. For example, I can count on one hand (okay, maybe two) the pitchers I’d be willing to start in Colorado. Meanwhile, I’d probably be willing to start half of the guys available on the waiver wire if they had a two-start week in San Diego and San Francisco.

Know your matchups, and know when to bench players – especially pitchers. Fly ball pitchers are going to have good starts in big ballparks. Even decent pitchers are going to have good starts against the hapless Nationals. Pitchers with control problems won’t necessarily have a problem with the Angels, but will really struggle against the Red Sox (then again, most pitchers will struggle against the Red Sox). The general rule of thumb is that several awful starts are difficult to overcome (especially in head-to-head leagues), so unless you have one of the best pitchers in the game, you want to avoid most matchups against the Yankees and Red Sox (especially in Fenway), as well as games played in Colorado, Chicago (mainly the southsiders), Arizona, Texas, Cincinnati and Philadelphia. Again, use your judgment, but many times the best decision is avoiding a potentially dangerous start.

And if you have the time/desire, you can often exploit matchups as well. Perhaps that last spot on your rotation is best served by rotating between pitchers on the waiver wire, depending on who is starting against whom. Perhaps one pitcher is slightly better than another but has a far worse matchup – bad offenses and certain ballparks can make some pitchers look a lot better than they actually are.

While it is easier to rotate pitchers than hitters, you can exploit hitters’ matchups too. In daily leagues it is sometimes worthwhile picking up a decent hitter if he has a roadtrip that sends him to Colorado and Arizona for six games, for example. Or it might be worth benching or dropping someone who has a road trip against the top two pitching staffs in baseball. Possibilities for exploitation abound.

Yes, most people know about park effects, but not many of them attempt to take full advantage of these effects. If you do take advantage of park effects, you will have a rather significant competitive advantage.

Strategy Session – Intricacies Are Important

Every league is a little different. Some have 8 teams, some have 12. Some are NL Only. Some have daily lineup updates, some weekly. Some have three day waiver periods, others have one day periods. Some have two catchers; others have four utility spots. Knowing the intricacies of your league is extremely important for success.

For example, let’s say you play in a league with daily updates. Assuming you have the time and energy, it may be possible to take advantage of this in a number of ways. First of all, you can draft players who may struggle against left-handed pitchers, because you are generally able to bench them when they face lefties and play someone else instead, thereby extracting maximum value. Or you may be able to stock up on relief pitchers, knowing that you can simply rotate the several starting pitchers on your team only when they take the hill.

Or let’s say that you play in a league with two catchers. That means that there are going to be some seriously bad catchers on peoples’ rosters – therefore, you may want to use some of your earlier round picks on two of the better catchers. Not only does this assure you of solid production from your catching position, but it somewhat corners the market on catchers, causing other teams to have to settle for very minimal production from their catching spot.

Or let’s say that your league has an unusually high amount of utility or DH slots. If this is the case, you may want to stock up on as many outstanding offensive players early in the draft, since you don’t have to worry about their position. A team with Albert Pujols, , Mark Teixeira, Prince Fielder and Adrian Gonzalez as their first four picks normally wouldn’t seem very smart, but if you have the utility spots to cover those players, it may be worthwhile.

In a 10 team league without a middle infielder position, you may want to wait to draft a second baseman or shortstop (or both), because you can get a decent player at those positions very late in the draft. But in a 12-team league with a “middle infield” position as well as SS and 2B, you may not want to wait as long, because the remaining players who qualify at those positions will be terrible.

Every league is different. Before you draft, take the time to understand the intricacies of your league, and think about what they mean for you. There is almost always a way to take advantage of small things in a league – and the best players figure them out before everyone else.

Konerko’s Not Dead Yet

Remember when Paul Konerko was an elite hitter? It wasn’t that long ago that the White Sox first baseman hit .313/.381/.551 with 35 homers. In fact, Konerko posted that line in 2006, after eclipsing the 40 homer mark in both 2004 and 2005.

Of course, one the tenets of baseball analysis is that hitters – especially one dimensional sluggers, tend to age rather rapidly. However, Konerko is only going to be 33 years old, and has shown signs that he may not have run out of steam entirely.

Last season, Konerko had a rather mediocre line of .240/.344/.438 with 22 homers in 122 games. However, as we will see, Konerko was struck with a bout of bad luck, and also showed significant signs of life towards the end of the season.

The first thing to note about Konerko’s 2008 was his poor luck with balls in play. His BABIP was a mere .247, much lower than his career average of .285. His line drive percentage remained high, at 21.5%, right in line with his career LD% of 21.4%. Furthermore, he struck out at the same rate as he has over the last five seasons (he struck out in 18.3% of his at bats in 2008 – his K rate has remained between 18% and 19% every year dating back to 2004), and he actually had the highest walk rate of his career as well.

According to the BABIP model I introduced with Chris Dutton, Konerko’s expected BABIP was .280 this year (incidentally, Konerko is a good example of a player for whom the “old” model of predicting BABIP – namely, adding .120 to line drive percentage – is a poor indicator of true BABIP, as our “new” model has consistently predicted Konerko’s BABIP to be far lower than the “old” model). The 15% difference between Konerko’s actual BABIP and his expected BABIP was the 14th biggest difference among all full-time players in 2008 – in other words, Konerko was extremely unlucky on balls in play.

Furthermore, Konerko’s 2008 was plagued with injury woes. Konerko strained his oblique and was put on the disabled list in June – he was hitting a paltry .215/.325/.368 with 8 homers at the time, so it’s very possible that Konerko tried to play through the injury before finally being placed on the DL (in fact, in the 30 games prior to the DL, Konerko hit only .202/.281/.330).

After coming back from the injury on July 8, Konerko hit like himself again. In the final 60 games of the season, Konerko posted a line of .267/.366/.514 with 14 homers – while striking out 37 times and drawing 30 walks. He suffered a sprained knee in September but managed to play well despite it; both the knee and oblique should be fully healthy in 2009.

At age 33, Konerko will remain an injury risk, and likely will not be able to perform at the same level that he did in his peak. However, rumors of his demise are greatly exaggerated. Konerko suffered from a tremendous amount of bad luck on balls in play that should regress next season, thus raising hit batting average.

Furthermore, although he may not hit 40 homers, he still has enough power to hit 30-35 bombs, and will be helped (as always) by the fly-ball-friendly confines of US Cellular Field. As Konerko demonstrated in the last three months of 2009, when healthy he can still be an offensive force. And he can probably be had relatively late in most drafts, as less-astute owners will assume that he’s washed up.

Paul Konerko is an excellent sleeper for fantasy baseball in 2009.

Is Schafer a Future Star?

The Braves are loaded with outfield prospects. Jason Heyward is one of the best prospects in the game. Gorkys Hernandez could be an everyday center fielder. And Jordan Schafer may be a future star. Of these three, Schafer is the closest to the majors, and bears watching in fantasy leagues in 2009.

Jordan Schafer’s 2008 season didn’t exactly start well. In fact, it was put on hold after 11 at bats: Schafer was suspended for 50 games for use of HGH. Schafer returned in June and played well in June and July for the Braves’s double-A affiliate in Mississippi, but he really turned it on in August. In 100 at bats in August, Schafer hit .320/.409/.630 with 6 homers and 7 doubles. Granted, it’s a small sample size, but it also would make sense that Schafer may need a month or two to get himself back into the game, physically and mentally.

Overall, Schafer hit .269/.378/.471 with 10 homers and 12 steals, which is extremely impressive for a 21-year old in double-A. He showed solid plate discipline, striking out 88 times but walking 49. And if we look closer, we can see that Schafer’s season was even more impressive.

Mississippi is generally a pitcher’s park, and it depressed homers by 18% in 2007. Schafer’s home/road splits reflect the difficult hitting environment in Mississippi: at home, Schafer hit .239/.378/.373, but on the road he hit .293/.376/.549. Schafer also hit nine of his ten homers on the road. Therefore, it’s fair to surmise that Schafer’s numbers would have been even better if he played half of his games in a more neutral environment.

On the flip side, Schafer really struggled against left handed pitching, hitting only .196/.306/.299 against southpaws, while crushing righties to the tune of .309/.416/.565. Schafer is still quite young and has plenty of time to improve against lefties – whether he is able to improve against them could be the difference between whether he becomes an above-average player or a star.

Jordan Schafer’s career thus far looks quite similar to another center fielder: Grady Sizemore. Sizemore’s performance at double-A was eerily similar to Schafer’s (minus the suspension), as Sizemore hit .304/.373/.480 with 13 homers and 10 steals (and a 73/49 K/BB ratio) –remember, Schafer hit .269/.378/.471 with 10 homers and 12 steals (and a 88/49 K/BB ratio). Sizemore’s line was more impressive – Sizemore was only 20 at the time, while Schafer was 21, and Sizemore’s strikeout rate was much better than Schafer’s. However, Sizemore – like Schafer – struggled mightily against lefties, and Sizemore – like Schafer – had a well-rounded game and scouts could easily project power in the future.

Obviously, Jordan Schafer is unlikely to become Grady Sizemore. Sizemore developed nearly perfectly, Sizemore’s season at double-A was slightly better than Schafer’s, and Sizemore was a year younger at the time (which makes a huge difference). However, the similarities between the two are not to be taken lightly, and even if Schafer doesn’t become as good as Sizemore, Schafer can still be a star.

Atlanta has never been hesitant to promote young players to the majors, and there are no major roadblocks to prevent Schafer from ascending to the big leagues. He offers a unique blend of speed and power, and has enough plate discipline that he should be an asset even without a high batting average. Schafer’s strikeout rate wasn’t terrible, but it was high enough to suggest that he could have a rather low batting average, at least in his first year or two in the majors, but he offers enough additional skills that he could be useful to you anyway.

Schafer is still young and may struggle in his first taste of the big leagues. Don’t expect him to storm into the majors like Jay Bruce did last year. However, if Schafer gets 300 at bats, he could hit 10 homers and steal 10 bases, while scoring and driving in a fair amount of runs and hitting .250 or so. There is some value in a player like that, especially a mid-season waiver-wire pickup. Schafer’s long-term star is very, very bright, but his 2009 may be somewhat of a disappointment.

Strategy Session – It’s All Relative

This may be the single most important piece of fantasy advice I could give anyone: everything about your draft depends on the other owners – how they value players. Therefore, you should try to enter your draft with as much knowledge of how everyone else is thinking as possible.

How do you do that? Well, it depends on the league. Some of you are probably playing in leagues with people you’ve known for a long time. You know that your friend is huge Red Sox fan, and is probably going to overvalue Kevin Youkilis. You know that another friend absolutely hates the Red Sox, and would rather lose the league than have Josh Beckett on his team. Another person has a thing for no-name starters, and someone else always likes to punt saves.

The more information you have on your leaguemates’ tendencies, the better you will be able to draft. You’ll know that you’re probably not going to get Kevin Youkilis; you’ll know that one person is unlikely to steal any closers from you; you’ll know that the no-name starter you’ve had your eye on may get taken sooner than you think. All of this knowledge will help you get the most value from your draft.

But for most of you, you’ll be playing in a league with people you barely know or have never met. In these leagues, the best way to gauge what other people are thinking is to read up on fantasy baseball as much as you can. Imagine that everyone else is reading similar things as you – and forming their opinions based off of what they read. Everyone else is seeing the same list of “sleepers” and “busts,” and forming their opinions accordingly. Everyone else is reading mock drafts to see what players tend to be taken where, and they are making judgments about whom to take in what round.

Okay, now you know what everyone else is thinking. The key is then to find out how to exploit it. How does your own opinion differ from “conventional wisdom?” Do you agree about all of the potential sleepers or potential busts? Do you have a source for information – like, say, RotoGraphs – that you particularly trust? Do you have a source that you think many of your less statistically inclined leaguemates avoid? If so, use this information to find out how to extract maximum value from the “conventional wisdom.”

As with everything else in fantasy baseball, this is not a fool-proof plan. There is inevitably going to be an owner who doesn’t think along the same lines as conventional wisdom – perhaps there’s even a player or two who has read this article and is taking the same tact. However, the best way to gauge how other people value players is to see how they are being valued in general, and then adjust your own strategy accordingly.

Is Washburn Washed Up?

Jarrod Washburn is not a guy I’ve wanted on my fantasy teams over the last few years. But this year, that could change.

Let’s be clear: Washburn is not a particularly good pitcher. However, Washburn has been remarkably consistent in his time with the Mariners: since 2006, he’s posted FIPs of 4.78, 4.77 and 4.72. His fastball averages less than 88 MPH, and he only managed to strike out 5.3 batters per nine innings last year. So why am I writing about him?

Because Washburn could have some value this year, thanks to the defense behind him.

Washburn is a fly ball pitcher who allows a lot of balls in play. He doesn’t strike many batters out, and he relies on his defense to turn batted balls into outs. Washburn’s career BABIP is .282, lower than many pitchers’ BABIPs. However, in his career Washburn has allowed 43.7% of his balls in play to be fly balls, as compared to only 36.3% grounders. By their nature, fly balls become outs more often than grounders, perhaps explaining Washburn’s relative success on balls in play.

Last year, however, Washburn’s BABIP was .309 – the highest BABIP in Washburn’s career. In fact, 2008 was the only year in his 11-year career in which his BABIP has been over .300. That’s amazing. Thing is, the high BABIP appears to be a fluke – related more to the Mariners’s poor defense last year, rather than a decline in Washburn’s skills. Washburn’s strikeout rate was actually higher last year than it was in 2005 and 2006, and was only slightly lower than his 2007 rate. He also managed to lower his walk rate from 2007, and batters made contact approximately as often as they had in the past. In other words, Washburn may not be particularly good, but he’s not getting much worse, either.

And he has reason to be optimistic for 2009. Earlier this offseason, the Mariners completed a three-way trade in which they acquired Franklin Gutierrez and Endy Chavez – two of the best defensive outfielders in the game. Gutierrez will likely be the starting center fielder, with Ichiro in right. Left field is undecided at the moment, but the Mariners have shown a dedication to improving their defense. Washburn should benefit from regression to the mean, as his .309 BABIP from last year was an outlier in his career. But he should benefit further from an improved Mariners defense – especially outfield defense – that turns more balls in play into outs. If the Mariners defense allows Washburn to improve upon his career BABIP by 20 points, he’d have a .262 BABIP, which would lead to an ERA probably around 4.00 or 4.20.

Even with a strikeout rate around five batters per nine and a woeful offense preventing him from getting many wins, Jarrod Washburn could have some value in large mixed leagues or AL Only leagues thanks to a potentially stellar ERA and WHIP. He’s certainly no fantasy ace, but as a late round pickup in a deep league, you could do a lot worse than Jarrod Washburn.

Strategy Session – Know Your Sleepers

Before your draft, you should understand what players you think are going to be undervalued by others. These are the guys you want to target. For example, if you think Jonathan Sanchez is going to be valued as approximately an 11th round pick*, and you think his talent is worthy of a 7th round pick, it’d be a mistake to draft him in the 7th round. Most likely, no one else is going to be thinking about taking him for another three or four rounds. Therefore, to get the most value out of Sanchez, you should take him in the 10th round (or 9th, if you’re worried). By doing this, you are in essence getting two 7th round picks – the one you actually choose in the 7th round, and Sanchez, who you believe was worthy of a 7th-rounder but you didn’t take until the 10th round.

This strategy also works particularly well for position players, although it’s a little more complicated. Let’s say that you think Rickie Weeks is going to be undervalued, and you’d be perfectly fine with having him as your starting second baseman. Let’s also say that for your first round pick, you are debating between Chase Utley and Jose Reyes. Who should you take? There’s not a huge difference between Utley and Reyes in overall value. But you think that Weeks is going to be undervalued, and that you can “steal” him very late in the draft. If that’s the case, it makes sense to draft Reyes in the first round, rather than Utley. If you drafted Utley, you’d be getting a fantastic player, but you’d also be negating a competitive advantage – namely, your belief in Rickie Weeks being undervalued. By drafting Reyes and saving second base for Weeks later in the draft, you have extracted maximum value.

This strategy is not without risks – it only takes one other person to value Weeks as highly as you for him to be snatched from under your fingertips. Thus, you need a backup plan, a “worst case scenario” plan. If you lose Weeks in the 12th round, are there any other second baseman who are going to be available that late that you think are somewhat undervalued? If so, then they are your backup plan. Or perhaps you’re willing to “punt” second base, and essentially hope to trade for someone or find someone on the waiver wire.

If you can’t possibly think of a backup plan, then you need to be wary of putting all of your eggs in Weeks’s basket. Yes, he may be undervalued, but if you miss out on him your team may be in deep trouble. This is something to keep in mind when thinking about sleepers. However, it’s very rare that your team won’t be able to overcome something like missing out on Rickie Weeks. The advantage of getting a player who is much better than where he is drafted almost always outweighs the risk of missing out on that player and ending up with a scrub instead.

*Note: I am not necessarily endorsing Sanchez as an 11th round pick, or a 7th round pick. I am merely using Sanchez and these numbers as an example, to demonstrate a point.