Ladies and gentleman: ready your pitchforks. Light your torches. Today, I am going to commit baseball sacrilege. I come not to bury the Yankee Captain, but I must point out that in many respects, Derek Jeter’s 2008 campaign was the worst of his career.

This past season, Jeter posted just a 0.26 WPA/LI, the lowest full-season mark of his distinguished career and a middling 8th among 17 qualified shortstops. Jeter’s .408 slugging percentage, .107 Isolated Power (ISO) and .343 wOBA were also career lows.

Since an outstanding 2006 season (.343/.417/.483), Jeter’s production has taken a sizeable hit in each of the past two years. Using the same formula to convert wOBA into runs above average that we employed while examining Miguel Cabrera, it becomes apparent that the 1992 first-rounder has been hemorrhaging offensive value:

2006

Jeter’s wOBA: .399
AL LG wOBA: .339

37.3 Runs Above Average

2007

Jeter’s wOBA: .369
AL LG wOBA: .338

19.25 Runs Above Average

2008

Jeter’s wOBA: .343
AL LG wOBA: .335

4.65 Runs Above Average

Granted, 2006 was one of Jeter’s better seasons with the bat, but he has lost over three wins of offensive value since that point.

While Jeter has shown pretty solid pop for a shortstop in his career (.458 SLG, .142 ISO), he has often put the ball on the grass. His groundball percentage has hovered between 56.1% and 60% over the past four seasons, and sits at 55.6% for his career. With pretty solid speed and a line-drive bat (career 20.8 LD%), Jeter has consistently posted high Batting Average On Balls in Play (BABIP) marks (.361 career). However, it seems as though those skills might be in the process of eroding. Jeter’s 17.9 LD% in 2008 was the lowest mark that Fan Graphs has going back to 2002, and his .336 BABIP was the second-lowest of his career.

While it’s possible that his BABIP drop was just a blip, it seems pretty unlikely. Our own Peter Bendix recently co-authored a study on Expected BABIP at The Hardball Times, which introduced a more comprehensive and accurate way of measuring XBABIP for hitters. Among the facets of a player’s game that bode well for XBABIP are batting eye, line drive percentage, speed score and pitches per plate appearance. His batting eye (0.61 BB/K) was essentially unchanged (0.59 career) and his 3.7 P/PA was normal, but Jeter has shown significant erosion in the other two categories As mentioned before, Jeter’s 2008 LD% was his lowest mark by a decent margin, and it appears as though the captain’s wheels are grinding to a halt.

Using Bill James’ Speed Score, we can get a better read on Jeter’s speed (or lack thereof) in recent seasons. Speed Score is found by calculating a player’s score in five categories: stolen base percentage, stolen base attempts, triples, runs scored per times on base and number of times grounded into a double play. By adding all five categories up and dividing by five, you get the player’s Speed Score. Speed Scores range from 0-10, with the average player posting a number in the range of five. If you want the full details on the formula used, take a look here.

Here are Jeter’s Speed Scores over the past three seasons…

2006

SB%: 8.09
SB Attempts: 5.77
Triples: 2.96
Runs: 7.62
GDP: 5.87

Total Speed Score: 6.06

2007

SB%: 4
SB Attempts: 4.61
Triples: 3.08
Runs: 7.03
GDP: 3.03

Total Speed Score: 4.49

2008

SB%: 4.17
SB Attempts: 4.03
Triples: 3
Runs: 6.62
GDP: 1.4

Total Speed Score: 3.84

Since 2006, Jeter has gone from possessing above-average speed to posting a Speed Score more commensurate with a first base/DH type. Another Bill James stat, Base Running Net Gain, also showcases Jeter’s slowing game. Base Running Net Gain compares a player to the league average in: advancing from first base to third base, second to home, first to home, ground into double play percentage, and stolen base percentage. A swift runner for most of his career (with a net base running gain of +76), Jeter is now below-average:

2006: +24 Net Bases
2007: +9 Net Bases
2008: -13 Net Bases

Not surprisingly, Jeter’s XBABIP under Peter’s system has fallen each year as well: .339 in ’06, .332 in ’07 and .310 this past season. With a three-year decline in LD% and rapidly deteriorating speed, Jeter’s BABIP drop looks like a significant trend, not just an anomaly. Posting a GB% near sixty was okay for the lithe, peak-career version of Derek Jeter, who possessed the athleticism to beat out fielders and reach base on infield hits. However, it’s a much less viable strategy for the current, decline-phase Jeter, who appears to be squarely in the clutches of father time.

I realize that criticizing Jeter is sort of the baseball equivalent of bashing Santa Claus, but there are undeniably a number of concerning trends here. A five year decline in ISO..a three year decline in LD%…a high GB% without the requisite speed to make those worm-burners count. I don’t really see a “flotation device”, a skill to fall back on. It sounds downright odd to say, but you might just want to avoid that Jeter guy on draft day.

Feeling none too comfortable with the prospect of an in-house option taking over at shortstop, the St. Louis Cardinals went out and acquired Khalil Greene from the San Diego Padres. The 13th overall selection in the 2002 amateur draft, Greene was picked up in exchange for relief prospect Mark Worrell and a player to be named later. While Greene’s production went south in 2008, he still constitutes a decent value for the Cardinals, considering his $6.5 million price tag.

In sort of the inverse of the Matt Holliday trade, the first thought that will go through many heads about this swap is that Greene is now liberated. His offensive production is going to trend up now that he’s out of the treacherous environs of Petco Park. And certainly, that’s true to some extent. However, it would very likely be incorrect to assume that Greene’s career road numbers (.270/.318/.484) constitute his true talent level. By making such an assumption, one would be ignoring half of Greene’s career data, giving us a smaller and less reliable sample size. Rather than just tossing aside his home stats (.225/.289/.369), we can use context-neutral measures to get a better gauge on just what sort of hitter Greene has been over the past several years.

Luckily, Fangraphs has just such a context-neutral stat in WPA/LI. WPA/LI expresses offensive wins (without the leverage aspect of Win Probability Added), and is park adjusted. Using WPA/LI, we can evaluate Greene’s bat free of the run-suppressing tendencies of his home ballpark. Here are Greene’s WPA/LI numbers from 2004-2008, with his mark among qualified shortstops in parentheses:

2004: 0.16 (9/23)
2005: 0.55 (9/25)
2006: -0.48 (15/27)
2007: 1.69 (5/27)
2008: -1.56 (21/24)

Prior to 2008’s statistical face plant (more on that later), Greene had essentially been in the middle of the pack offensively among shortstops. Playing half of his games in a brutal offensive environment, the 29 year-old is a career .248/.304/.427 hitter. If we want to get a more accurate barometer of what his triple-slash lines would look like had he played in a neutral offensive environment, we can do that by using the amazing Baseball-Reference website.

B-R has a Play Index tool that adjusts a player’s production to fit particular run-scoring environments and home ballparks. Using this tool, we can place each year of Greene’s career in a neutral National League ballpark, adjusting for the Runs/Game average of that season to root out the effects of Petco. Here are Greene’s actual slash statistics, followed by his lines adjusted to a neutral NL ballpark:

2004 (4.64 NL Runs/G):

Actual: .273/.349/.446 Adjusted: .292/.371/.473

2005 (4.45 NL Runs/G):

Actual: .250/.296/.431 Adjusted: .262/.309/.451

2006 (4.76 NL Runs/G):

Actual: .245/.320/.427 Adjusted: .254/.330/.444

2007 (4.71 NL Runs/G):

Actual: .254/.291/.468 Adjusted: .263/.302/.483

2008 (4.54 NL Runs/G):

Actual: .213/.260/.339 Adjusted: .225/.274/.359

As mentioned earlier, Greene is a career .248/.304/.427 hitter. By taking his adjusted lines and weighing each year based on his number of plate appearances, I found that Greene’s career adjusted batting line is .261/.318/.447.

So, adjusting for Petco Park, Green has basically been a .260/.320/.450-type hitter. That’s pretty useful from a shortstop, both in real and fantasy baseball. However, what are we to make of Greene’s wretched performance this past season? Already a free swinger, Greene swung at just about everything in 2008, including birds, small aircrafts and, evidently, storage chests. His Outside Swing Percentage (O-Swing%) has been steadily rising over the past few years. Not coincidentally, so has his First Pitch Strike Percentage (F-Strike%):

2005: 22.7 O-Swing%, 58.2 F-Strike%
2006: 25.6 O-Swing%, 59 F-Strike%
2007: 29.2 O-Swing%, 60.4 F-Strike%
2008: 34.8 O-Swing%, 65 F-Strike%

To be sure, Greene is going to have to get his hacking tendencies in check if he’s going to bounce back to his 2004-2007 offensive levels. However, he did seem to suffer some poor fortune on balls put in play in 2008. Despite a 20.6 Line Drive Percentage (LD%), Greene posted just a .262 BABIP.

A below-average BABIP is nothing new for Greene, however, as his career mark sits at .285 despite a career 19.5 LD%. Greene is a pretty extreme flyball hitter (his 47.6 FB% in ’08 ranked 8th among all batters). Considering the spacious dimensions of Petco, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suggest that Green’s below-average BABIP is at least somewhat the product of his skills being ill-suited to his home ballpark. However, a recent study that Peter Bendix co-authored about expected BABIP for The Hardball Times suggests that Greene was not as unlucky as LD% alone would make him out to be (under Peter’s model, Greene’s XBABIP is only slightly better at .271).

New Busch Stadium has played like a pitcher’s park during its first three seasons, suppressing runs by six percent and home runs by 16 percent. That’s not ideal for a flyball-oriented hitter like Greene, but it’s still an improvement over his previous home environment (over that same time frame, Petco has decreased run production by 20 percent and HR production by 19 percent). If Greene eases up on his ever-expanding strike zone, he should be worth a draft pick in deeper leagues. However, anyone taking Greene’s career road numbers and expecting him to reproduce them over a full season is more than likely going to be disappointed.

Several years back, Miguel Tejada was one of the standard-bearers at the shortstop position. The Dominican native combined tremendous power from his stocky 5-9, 215 pound frame with an uncanny ability to put the bat on the ball. Tejada’s high-power (career .184 Isolated Power), high-contact (13.5 K%) act has allowed him to accumulate 10.61 WPA/LI during the course of his career.

Unfortunately, that star-caliber player has since left the building. While Tejada turned in an unexpectedly slick season with the glove (+7 in John Dewan’s Plus/Minus system), his power continued on a downward slope in 2008. His .131 ISO tied his career-low mark, set all the way back in 1997 when he was a fresh-faced rookie. In fact, Tejada’s slugging percentage has declined every season since 2004. Since slugging a whopping .534 that year, he has posted marks of .515 in ’05, .498 in ’06, .442 in ’07 and just .415 this past season. With a -1.27 WPA/LI, Tejada was the fifth-least productive shortstop among all qualified players in 2008.

While the 34 year-old has never been mistaken for a patient hitter (his career BB% is 6.8), Tejada took his hacking to a higher level in 2008. After drawing walks at a 7.4% clip in 2007, be posted just a 3.7 BB% this past season. Miguel swung at 53% of the pitches that he saw, putting him near the top of the majors and in the company out-machines such as Jose Guillen and Carlos Gomez. After posting an identical Outside Swing Percentage (O-Swing%) of 28.4% in 2006 and 2007, Tejada chased 34.7% of pitches out of the strike zone in ’08. That figure was the 10th-highest among all qualified batters.

With Tejada’s power declining precipitously, opposing pitchers have become far more willing to challenge him with a fastball. As his slugging percentage has waned, Miguel has been seeing heaters with increasing frequency:

Tejada’s Percentage of Fastballs Seen, 2005-2008:

2005: 59.7%
2006: 60.7%
2007: 61.5%
2008: 66.1%

Miguel was challenged more than just about anyone in 2008, with the 9th-highest fastball percentage in the big leagues. Considering that Tejada is less of a threat to punish a fastball and deposit it in the bleachers these days, pitchers likely see less reason to pitch him so carefully. While Miguel Tejada in his peak seasons earned the veneration of hurlers everywhere, the later-career Astros version is treated more like a slap hitter.

Tejada was one heck of a player in his Oakland and Baltimore days, and perhaps there’s some hope for a bounceback- his Line Drive percentage (LD%) was still a healthy 23.4% in 2008. However, with rapidly declining pop and a willingness to swing at near anything, it’s best to evaluate Tejada based on his current merits, not his name value.

Heading into the 2004 amateur entry draft, Florida State star Stephen Drew was considered to be the top talent available. A lefty-hitting shortstop with power and enough leather to stick at a premium position, Baseball America labeled Drew a “five-tool player.” However, Scott Boras-induced bonus demands caused Drew to slip a bit on draft day, before the Arizona Diamondbacks anted up at pick #15 and delivered a considerable bounty. Though negotiations were contentious, the D-Backs eventually got their man for a cool $4 million, which tied Jered Weaver (also a Boras client who slipped to the Angels at pick #12) for the highest bonus among 2004 draftees.

It didn’t take long for J.D. and Tim’s little brother to make it to the big leagues, as Stephen reached Arizona during the second half of the 2006 season. A college-trained hitter with a high pedigree, Drew predictably beat up on lower level pitching, but posted solid-if-unspectacular numbers in the hitter-friendly confines of the Pacific Coast League. The 6-1, 195 pounder was highly impressive in his first major league stint, however, posting a .316/.357/.517 line in 226 PA. His plate discipline was pretty rough (6.3 BB%, 23.9 K%), but Drew posted a .201 Isolated Power (ISO) number and a healthy 23.8 line drive rate (LD%). His .396 Batting Average on Balls in Play (BABIP) was still extremely high, as his line drive rate suggested that his BABIP should have come in around .358. All things considered, a 23 year-old player at an up-the-middle position raking right from the get-go is pretty rare.

However, instead of building upon his early-career success, Drew crawled to a .238/.313/.370 line in 2007, with a -1.12 WPA/LI. That figure put Drew in the company of a sordid group at his position, including on-base ciphers Omar Vizquel, Tony Pena Jr. and Juan Uribe. Some of his regression can be chalked up to bad luck, as his sky-high BABIP sank to a lowly .271. However, Drew’s LD% also dipped, down to 16.5%. His expected BABIP was .285, so if we adjust for some bad bounces, Drew’s line “improves” to .252/.327/.384. That still represented a troubling drop in production, particularly in the power department (Drew’s ISO slipped nearly 70 points, down to .133). If you want to look for a silver lining, Drew’s walk rate climbed to 10% and he struck out only 18.4% of the time.

In 2008, Drew essentially replicated his 2006 season, showcasing an aggressive approach that led to 21 home runs and 11 triples (fun fact: according to the 2009 Bill James Handbook, Chase Field increased triples production 76 percent more than the average park from 2006-2008). Drew’s walk rate was identical to his ’06 mark (6.3%), but he lowered his K rate again (17.8%), posted a career-high .211 ISO and hit line drives at a 22.6% clip. His WPA/LI climbed to 0.83, ranking 6th among all shortstops.

In his three years in the big leagues, Drew has produced two stellar campaigns where he took aggressive hacks and experienced a high degree of success. In 2007, when he actively took more pitches, his line drive rate and power fell by a considerable margin. During his solid 2006 and 2008 seasons, Drew had an O-Swing%’s of 30.6% and 28.2%, respectively. Drew’s O-Swing% fell to 21.8% during his more passive 2007 season, but he failed to sting the ball. It seems as though Drew is at his best when he’s looking to swing early in the count, looking for a pitch to drive into Chase Field’s spacious outfield gaps. He has also become more proficient in making contact with pitches thrown out of the strike zone, and has increased his overall Contact% each year:

Drew’s O-Contact% and Contact%, 2006-2008:

2006: 51.2 O-Contact%, 74.3 Contact%
2007: 57.5 O-Contact%, 82 Contact%
2008: 61.8 O-Contact%, 82.6 Contact%

Conventional wisdom says that hitters are best off utilizing a patient approach at the plate, and for many players, that sort of style works wonders. However, in Drew’s case, a “grip-it-and-rip-it” philosophy just may be more effective than a “take-and-rake” design.

Is Hanley Ramirez the next 40/40 player?

In his third full year in the majors, Hanley Ramirez hit .301/.400/.540 with 33 homers and 35 steals. And yet, there’s reason to believe that next year, Ramirez could be even better.

First of all, Hanley ran less this year than before – he attempted only 47 steals, as compared to 66 and 65 attempts in the previous two years. Is this a case of Hanley understanding that the season is long and pacing himself, or is this flukey? If Ramirez’s stolen base attempts fall somewhere in between his first two years and last year, he should end up with at least 40 steals.

Secondly, Hanley struggled against lefties last year, posting a .790 OPS. However, he improved drastically against righties, posting a .983 OPS. This is quite a change from the previous two seasons, when he posted an OPS nearly 200 points higher against left-handed pitching.

Chances are, Hanley’s improvement against righties is relatively real, but his numbers against lefties are a sample size fluke. If he hits lefties better in 2009 – which he should – his overall numbers should improve.

Additionally, Hanley improved his power a lot last season, but some of this was obscured by the fact that the number of fly balls he hit was down. In fact, 19.1% of his fly balls became homers, as compared to 12.7% in 2007 and 9.7% in 2006. However, he hit fly balls on only 36.7% of his balls in play, as compared to 41.9% in 2007.

Also, Hanley struck out more often in 2008 (perhaps as a result of trying to hit for more power), striking out in over 20% of his at bats, as compared to less than 15% in 2007.

In order for Hanley to hit more homers in 2009 than he did in 2008, he has to either strike out less or hit more fly balls. Chances are the increase in the amount of fly balls becoming homers is for real – it’s certainly not unusual for a toolsy young player to increase his power output around age 24. It’s quite reasonable to assume that at least one of the previous conditions will occur, and perhaps both, thus making 40 homers well within Ramirez’s reach.

Certainly, a lot of things have to go right for Hanley Ramirez to hit 40 homers and steal 40 bases. But it’s a very possible for him to reach both milestones, along with hitting (at least) .300 and playing shortstop. Hanley Ramirez should be a first-round pick in most drafts, and may even deserve to be the #2 pick in your draft (and there may even be an argument for taking him first overall), as he carries very little risk and a tremendous amount of upside.

Remember when Brandon Wood was a top prospect? Back in 2005, he had a ridiculous 98 extra base hits in the California League, posting a .672 slugging percentage (along with a .323 average and .383 OBP). He added three more extra base hits that season in triple-A, giving him 101 XBHs for the season. Not bad for a 20-year-old shortstop.

In 2006 he hit .276/.355/.552 with 25 homers and 18 steals (and was only caught three times) as a 21-year-old in double-A. Excellent, right? Yet many people chose to focus on his 149 strikeouts in 118 games, and glossed over his otherwise-fantastic season.

Then in 2007 he was promoted to triple-A, where he hit .272/.338/.497 for Salt Lake, a notorious hitter’s park in a notorious hitter’s league. Sure enough, his OPS was 100 points higher at home than on the road. And he struck out 120 times in 111 games. To further complicate things, he struggled mightily in 33 at bats with the big league team, hitting .152/.152/.273 and striking out 12 times.

In 2008 Wood seemingly regained his stroke, posting an impressive .295/.375/.595 line with 31 homers (in just 103 games) in triple-A, although he did strike out 104 times. While his OPS was once again almost 100 points higher at home than on the road, he still managed to post a .913 OPS on the road, and he hit 15 road homers as well.

But he once again disappointed in 150 at bats with at the major league level, hitting .200/.254/.327. However, Wood did stroke five homers and steal four bases, although he also struck out in over 28% of his plate appearances.

There are a few things to keep in mind about Wood. First, and most importantly, he’s only 23 years old. That is still quite young, and there is still plenty of time for him to fix the various flaws in his game.

Secondly, Wood actually had two separate stints with the Angels this season. The first time around, he hit .125/.164/.188 with 1 homer, while striking out in 33% of his plate appearances. The second time, he hit .256/.270/.430 with four homers, while striking out in 25% of his plate appearances. While this isn’t great, it’s a marked improvement.

Finally, Wood was extremely good in triple-A this year. Even though he played in a hitter’s park in a hitter’s league, his Major League Equivalent (MLE) was .235/.316/.436 with 22 homers in 408 at bats. He also stole 6 bases. Obviously, that’s not fantastic, but it’s also not bad, especially for a guy who will qualify at shortstop.

Brandon Wood is still very young, and still has tremendous power potential. He will strike out a lot, and therefore probably won’t hit for a very high batting average. However, he’s likely to qualify at shortstop – and perhaps third base – and should hit a lot of homers – and even steal some bases – if given playing time.

Wood could be an excellent late-round flier, as he has a tremendous amount of upside and will likely be given a chance in the fairly near future.

Stolen bases are annoying.

Most offensive stats in fantasy baseball are interrelated – if you hit a home run, you also score a run and drive (at least) a run in on at the same time. But stolen bases are almost entirely unrelated to the other offensive categories, and are therefore the most inefficient and difficult offensive stat to obtain.

Players who offer power as well as steals – such as Grady Sizemore – tend to be extremely valuable, and rightly so. Therefore, it behooves the smart fantasy player to find late-round picks who can rack up a lot of steals. While they may not contribute too much in other categories, the idea is that you are able to stock up on power hitters earlier, and then steal some steals (get it?) late.

With that in mind, meet Emmanuel Burriss.

The 23-year-old shortstop debuted for the San Francisco Giants this year, posting a line of .283/.357/.323. More importantly for you, he stole 13 bases (in 18 attempts) in a mere 240 at bats. With the departure of Omar Vizquel and the dearth of other shortstops in the Giants system, Burris has the inside track on the shortstop gig in San Francisco next year. Of course, he’s not likely to be particularly good – in fact, his minor league track record suggests that Burris may be one of the worst hitters in baseball next year.

However, that doesn’t really matter to you. What matters is that Burris is fast. Very fast. In 2007, he stole 68 bases in 125 games. The year before he stole 34 bases in 65 games. That kind of speed is rare to find – and it’s even rarer that a guy with that kind of speed is going to be playing every day.

Furthermore, Burriss has demonstrated an excellent ability to put the ball in play during his short professional career. Of course, he rarely walks and has virtually no power, but he also doesn’t strike out too often. This means that he should be able to keep his batting average respectable – even if his OBP is poor and his SLG is downright abysmal. While the Giants may be concerned about his lack of patience and power, fantasy players only care about his batting average and stolen bases – both of which should be respectable, at least.

Emmanuel Burriss isn’t very good, at least not yet. He won’t hit many homers or drive in many runs, but he’s extremely fast and is line to play every day. If he can manage 600 plate appearances this year, Burris could steal in the neighborhood of 40-50 bases. While the risk is rather high, there are few players out there who could give you that many steals…especially players who are likely to be available very late in your draft.

Coming into the 2008 season, Mike Aviles was not on the radar screen of many fans or analysts. A short (5-9), stocky (205 pounds) 27 year-old, Aviles was seen as more of an organizational solider than a future starter at the major league level. Signed for a mere $1,000 out of division two Concordia in the 7th round of the 2003 draft, Aviles had spent the prior two seasons putting up relatively mild numbers at AAA Omaha, posting a .679 OPS in 2006 and a .796 mark in 2007. Left off the 40-man roster last winter and ranked as the 29th-best prospect in the system by Baseball America, Aviles figured to spend another season toiling in the PCL.

However, two factors combined to make Aviles’ 2008 campaign a memorable one: 1.) he got off to a torrid start in his third stint at Omaha (.336/.369/.631 in 214 AB) and 2.) he had the good fortune of not being Tony Pena Jr. (Pena’s RC/27 of 1.18 was the lowest among all players with at least 200 PA- that’s right, a team of Tony Pena’s would somehow manage to score 1 run per game). Aviles more than improved upon the low standards of the man he replaced, posting a .325/.354/.480 line. His WPA/LI of 1.28 was the fourth-best among shortstops with at least 400 PA.

So, what can be expected of Mike Aviles going forward? On the positive side, Aviles has shown a propensity to put the bat on the ball, striking out no more than 11% of the time at the AAA level and whiffing 13.8% in the majors. Combined with decent pop for a middle infielder (.155 ISO), Aviles has some things going for him offensively.

However, there is one very large red flag waving over Aviles: the man does not like to walk. His BB%’s over the past three years at Omaha were 5.6, 5.3, and 4.9. With the Royals, he drew a free pass just 4.1% of the time. If anything, he’s going backward in this regard. Aviles swung at 35.5 percent of pitches thrown out of the strike zone in 2008. Among shortstops with 200 or more PA, only noted hackers Angel Berroa, Clint Barmes and our old friend Pena Jr. swung at more bad balls.

As a player who relies heavily upon his batting average to succeed, Aviles carries a higher degree of risk. His BABIP was .359 last season. Given his line drive rate (20.2%), we would expect his BABIP to be about .322 (LD% + .120 is the formula for expected BABIP). If we remove those 37 extra points of average from Aviles’ line, he has a less shiny .299/.332/.443. Batting average is prone to variation more than most other offensive stats, and it’s not uncommon to see a player with a .300 skillset like Aviles hit 20 or 30 points below that mark. For example, take Pirates second baseman Freddy Sanchez, another batting average-fueled middle infielder. A productive player when he hit .344 in 2006 and .304 in 2007, Sanchez was a fantasy killer when he hit just .271 in 2008.

Mike Aviles is someone to keep on the radar screen at a position where offense comes at a premium, but keep in mind that he needs those extra ducksnorts to fall in there to be productive. A .330-hitting Aviles is a quality player, but a .280-hitting Aviles isn’t near as attractive.